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INTRODUCTION
Judicial interpretation of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of
1995 (FTDA),' which created a federal cause of action to afford fa-
mous marks protection against later, unauthorized uses that blur, tar-
nish, or harm these marks' distinctiveness, has been unnecessarily in-
consistent. Courts have reached conflicting conclusions regarding a
claimant's prima facie requirements under the FTDA ever since the
statute's enactment, despite the FTDA's intended effect of providing
"predictability and uniformity" to trademark dilution law.3 Not only
has their analysis of what constitutes a famous trademark deserving of
4
federal protection been incongruent, the judiciary has also split over
what must be shown to prove actionable dilution. Specifically, the
Fourth and Fifth Circuits have maintained that a claimant must show
actual economic injury' to its famous mark in order to prevail under
t B.A. 1996, Cornell University; J.D. Candidate 2002, University of Pennsylvania
Law School. I am grateful to the editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review,
without whom publication of this Comment would not have been possible. I would
also like to thank my parents, sister, and brother-in-law for their unwavering support,
love, and encouragement.
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1127 (Supp. V 1999).
2 d. § 1125(c); see also H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 2 (1995) (stating that the main
reason Congress passed the FTDA was to "protect famous trademarks from subsequent
uses that blur the distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or disparage it"), reprinted in
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1029.
3 Christina M. Bidlingmaier, Case Note, No More Clowning Around: Ringling Bros.-
Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel Development
Evaluates the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 7 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 279, 299 (2000).
4 See Adam Omar Shanti, Comment, Measuring Fame: The Use of Empirical Evidence
in Dilution Actions, 5 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 177, 189 (2001) (observing that be-
cause dilution decisions have been based more on judicial intuition than on empirical
evidence, cuTent dilution jurisprudence has "produced an array of incongruent de-
terminations as to whether a trademark is famous").
For purposes of this Comment, I will use the terms "actual harm," "actual eco-
nomic harm," "actual economic loss," "actual economic injury," and "actual dilution"
interchangeably.
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the FTDA, while the Second, Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have
held that a plaintiff need only demonstrate a likelihood of harm.6
The Supreme Court has yet to resolve this "circus among the cir-
cuits, '7 but if the high Court eventually grants certiorari for an FTDA
claim, this Comment contends that the Court must adopt the actual
economic harm standard; the FTDA requires nothing less. Part I of
this Comment provides an overview of trademark law, mapping out in
particular the history and origins of dilution theory and its culmina-
tion in the FTDA. Part II highlights the three ways in which a trade-
mark can be diluted under the FTDA: cybersquatting, tarnishment,
and blurring. Part III discusses current federal dilution jurisprudence
and outlines two appellate decisions (and their progeny) representing
ground zero of the actual harm versus likelihood of injury debate.
The Comment concludes in Part IV by contending that the decisions
that required an actual economic harm test to prove dilution are on
the jurisprudential path most aligned with Congressional intent, the
language of the FTDA, and the underlying purposes of trademark law.
On the other hand, the circuits that follow the likelihood of dilution
standard provide incentives for judicial irresponsibility, subjective in-
tuition rather than law-based decision making, and statutory interpre-
tative abuse, resulting in anticompetitive (and thus, anti-FTDA) ef-
fects.
I. THE HISTORY OF DILUTION THEORY AND
ITS CULMINATION IN THE FTDA
A. Trademark Protection: A Brief Introductions
Trademarks are the distinctive names, slogans, devices, designs, or
symbols used by companies or individuals to distinguish, identify, and
advertise the source of their products and services to consumers.9 In
6 The terms "likelihood of harm," "likelihood of injury," and "likelihood of dilu-
tion" also will be used synonymously in this Comment.
7 Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, A Circus Among the Circuits: Would the Truly Famous and
Diluted Performer Please Stand Up? The Federal Trademark Dilution Act and Its Challenges, 1
J. INTELL. PROP. 158, 158 (2000) (noting that each circuit court that has addressed the
FTDA has "its own idea about dilution .... the meaning of dilution, ... and how to
prove dilution" and that it may be time for the Supreme Court to clarify the meaning
of the Act).
8 For a primer on trademark law, see SHELDON W. HALPERN ET AL.,
FUNDAMENTALS OF UNITED STATES INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COPYRIGHT,
PATENT, AND TRADEMARK 275-358 (1999).
9 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994) ("The term 'trademark' includes any word, name,
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identifying and differentiating products, trademarks facilitate advertis-
ing and marketing by efficiently conveying to the minds of consumers
positive associations between goods and the company that is the
source of those goods. ° Trademarks compactly inform buyers that
they will receive the same quality of products that they previously pur-
chased from a company, ensuring them a consistent level of quality in
the goods and services provided by that company." Thus, as con-
sumer recognition of the mark and its associated product or service
line increases, the trademark's value increases: it "comes to embody
the goodwill built up in consumers based on their experience with
[that] product."'2
If two or more trademarks in the marketplace are the same or very
similar, they are likely to cause consumer confusion, especially if the
marks are present in the same product or service market. Trademark
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof ... [used] to identify and distin-
guish.., goods.., from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the
source of the goods .... ); see also Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the
Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1695 (1999) ("We give protection to trade-
marks for one basic reason: to enable the public to identify easily a particular product
from a particular source.").
10 Lynda J. Oswald, "Tarnishment" and "Blurring" Under the Federal Trademark Dilu-
tion Act of 1995, 36 AM. Bus. L.J. 255, 255-56 (1999); see also Mishawaka Rubber &
Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942) (defining trademarks as
"merchandising short-cut[s]" and stating that the purpose of such marks is "to convey
through the mark, in the minds of potential customers, the desirability of the com-
modity upon which it appears").
H See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995)
("[T]rademark law, by preventing others from copying a source-identifying mark, re-
duces the customer's costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions [because a]
potential customer [is assured] that this item-the item with this mark-is made by the
same producer as other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the
past." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); 1 J. THOMAS McCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:3, at 2-3 (4th ed. 1996)
("[A] trademark is merely a symbol that allows a purchaser to identify goods or services
that have been satisfactory in the past and reject goods or services that have failed to
give satisfaction."); FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW
RELATING TO TRADE-MARKS 166 (1925) (stating that "the public is concerned with the
trade-mark not so much as an indication of origin but as a guaranty of quality").
12 Courtland L. Reichman, State and Federal Trademark Dilution, 17 FRANCHISE L.J.
111, 111 (1998); see alsoYale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928)
(Hand,J.) (stating that "[a merchant's] mark is his authentic seal; by it he vouches for
the goods which bear it; it carries his name for good or ill. If another uses it, he bor-
rows the owner's reputation, whose quality no longer lies within his own control");
Gerard N. Magliocca, One and Inseparable: Dilution and Infringement in Trademark Law,
85 MINN. L. REv. 949, 958 (2001) ("Marks also encourage producers to invest in qual-
ity by ensuring that they will reap the benefit of a fine reputation. Without trademark
protection, competitors could poach on the goodwill of a firm by putting that firm's
mark on their own goods." (citation omitted)).
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infringement is designed to remedy this situation by protecting pur-
chasers from being confused by the concurrent uses of the marks on
the goods as well as the relationship between the companies that pro-
duce and sell the goods. 3 Every infringement suit is thus centered on
the likelihood of consumer confusion. The laws proscribing trade-
mark infringement therefore serve to protect consitmers in their pur-
chasing decisions and to prevent company injury manifested in di-
verted customers due to free-riding on the more famous marks. 4
Trademark dilution laws, on the other hand, are not designed to
protect consumers per se but the trademarks themselves and their
owners. Dilution seeks to safeguard the advertising power of
marks-their persuasive ability to sell products.'6 In this regard, dilu-
tion differs from traditional infringement in that infringement con-
cerns competing parties' trademarks, while dilution concerns compet-
ing as well as noncompeting parties' trademarks."
13 See E. &J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1290 (9th Cir. 1992)
("The core element of trademark infringement is the likelihood of confusion, i.e.,
whether the similarity of the marks is likely to confuse customers about the source of
the products."); Christopher R. Perry, Note, Trademarks as Commodities: The "Famous"
Roadblock to Apllying Trademark Dilution Law in Cyberspace, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1127, 1130
(2000) (stating that trademark infringement was created to "protect consumers from
confusing products"). The Lanham Act codified this theory of trademark infringe-
ment, offering protection against uses that are "likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive." 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1994).
14 Without a remedy for trademark infringement, "cheap knockoffs" would be
able to use the marks of more famous, blue-chip companies, making it hard for the
well-known companies to distinguish their items, thereby "reduc[ing] the incentive for
[such] companies to pursue quality," leaving "consumers worse off." Magliocca, supra
note 12, at 958.
15 See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 955 F. Supp. 605, 615 (E.D. Va. 1997) ("Dilution is concerned not with protect-
ing consumers, but with protecting a property interest held by the owner of a famous
mark."), affd, 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999); Magliocca, supra note 12, at 961 ("Since
dilution focuses on the marks themselves rather than on consumers, the concept is
characterized as more akin to trespass than to consumer protection law."); Eric A.
Prager, The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Substantial Likelihood of Confusion, 7
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 121, 123 (1996) (distinguishing trademark
infringement and dilution by stating that damage due to dilution is "manifested not in
diverted customers, but in harm to the mark itself'). Dilution seeks to protect trade-
mark owners who have "gone to great lengths" to develop marks that are commercially
marketable and distinct. Id. at 965; see also H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995) ("The
concept of dilution recognizes the substantial investment the owner has made in the
mark and the commercial value and aura of the mark itself, protecting both from
those who would appropriate the mark for their own gain."), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029,1030.
16 Magliocca, supra note 12, at 960.
7 Bidlingmaier, supra note 3, at 283. Dilution also differs from infringement in
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Dilution is the diminishment of the capacity of a distinctive
trademark to identify and distinguish the source of goods and services
bearing that mark. 8 This is "serious injury" to a trademark's essence
since identifying and distinguishing the source of products is the very
function of a company's mark.' 9 Laws proscribing dilution are there-
fore directed to protect the distinct nature of a trademark and its as-
sociated selling power from being destroyed by those who appropriate
the mark for their own gain, whether or not there is consumer confu-
20sion.
The addition of trademark dilution to the Lanham Act is "vital" in
that it "fills a void [that exists for owners of] famous trademarks un-
able to sustain an infringement claim against the user of their mark
on a non-competing product or service.",2  In other words, dilution
begins where infringement and its likelihood of confusion test reach
their doctrinal limits.
22
that, because of dilution's requirement that the claimant's mark be distinct, "dilution
covers only a limited class of marks that possess significant inherent distinctiveness or
secondary meaning, while infringement is a remedy available for all valid marks." Ma-
gliocca, supra note 12, at 962; see also infra note 80 (noting that dilution may be found
whether or not competition exists and that only infringement requires a "likelihood of
confusion" showing).
18 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. V 1999).
19 Prager, supra note 14, at 123 ("[A] mark's capacity to identify a particular
source is its raison d'htre .... ).
20 The absence of consumer confusion would occur when a trademark is used on
noncompeting, unrelated goods or services. For example, the presence in the mar-
ketplace of Microsoft shoes may dilute the Microsoft trademark for computer software
as consumers would cease to think exclusively of software products when they hear the
name of Microsoft or see its logo. A proliferation of a Microsoft footwear line unaffili-
ated with the software company would harm the mark's commercial attractiveness. See
Hearings on HR. 11,592 Before the House Comm. on Patents, 72d Cong. 15 (1932) (state-
ment of Frank I. Schechter) ("If you allow Rolls Royce restaurants, and Rolls Royce
cafeterias, and Rolls Royce pants, and Rolls Royce candy, in 10 years you will not have
the Rolls Royce mark anymore."); Madrid Protocol Implementation Act and Federal Trade-
mark Dilution Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R 1270 and H.I 1295 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 124 (1996)
[hereinafter Madrid Protocol] (statement of Thomas E. Smith, Chair, Section of Intel-
lectual Property Law, American Bar Association) (reiterating Schechter's Rolls-Royce
example).
2e Shanti, supra note 4, at 180 n.21; see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995)
("Even in the absence of confusion, the potency of a mark may be debilitated by an-
other's use. This is the essence of dilution." (quoting Mortellito v. Nina of Cal., Inc.,
335 F. Supp. 1288,1296 (S.D.N.Y. 1972))), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029,1030.
22 Some commentators go so far as to contend that dilution necessarily follows in-
fringement and consumer confusion. See Magliocca, supra note 12, at 966 ("[l]t is
more accurate to say that infringement follows a fortiori from dilution.").
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B. Professor Schechter and the Birth of Dilution Theory
Professor Frank Schechter is generally credited with originating
the theory of trademark dilution in his 1927 article The Rational Basis
of Trademark Protection.2' His historical account and criticism of early
twentieth-century trademark protection in THE HISTORICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO TRADE-MARKS, written just two
years before his seminal article, highlighted trademark law's inability
to keep pace with modern commercial trade and the post-Industrial
24Revolution explosion. Schechter's critique of trademark law's "stag-
nation" was the "launching point" for his 1927 article.5
Schechter described dilution as the "gradual whittling away or
dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark
or name by its use upon non-competing goods., 26  This "whittling
away" was the injury Schechter believed needed legal protection.27 He
argued that certain trademark uses on noncompeting goods, while
not creating any buyer confusion as to the source of such goods, nev-
23 Frank 1. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV.
813 (1927). Although Schechter is generally regarded as the progenitor of trademark
dilution theory, the doctrine has been "traced back to a German case involving a
mouthwash manufacturer, Judgement of Sept. 11, 1924, Landgericht Elberfeld, 25Ju-
ristiche Wochemschrift 502, XXV Markenschutz und Wettbewerb (M.U.R.) 264."
Kenneth L. Port, The Illegitimacy of Trademark Incontestability, 26 IND. L. REV. 519, 556
n.202 (1993). American dilution law arguably can be traced almost thirty years before
Schechter's article to a British case involving the Kodak trademark. See Eastman Pho-
tographic Materials Co. v. John Griffiths Cycle Corp., 15 R.P.C. 105 (1898) (holding
that the Kodak Cycle Company wrongfully tried to benefit from the Kodak brand that
the Eastman Company had established); see also Oswald, supra note 10, at 261 n.23 (cit-
ing this "landmark British case" as an ancestor of American dilution law).
24 See SCHECHTER, supra note 11, at 146-50 (claiming that the "[1]egal evolution [of
trademark law] has not kept pace with functional change").
25 Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for
Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 801 (1997); see Schechter, supra note 23,
at 813-24 (arguing that modern conditions required a reworking of obsolete trade-
mark law); see alsoJerre B. Swann, Sr., Dilution Redefined for the Year 2000, 37 HoUs. L.
REV. 729, 730 (2000) (calling Schechter's article "a tour deforce in its primal recognition
of brand power").
26 Schechter, supra note 23, at 825.
27 In 1932, Schechter drafted a new federal trademark law that would have pro-
tected coined, fanciful, or arbitrary marks from "injury [to their] good will, reputation,
[or] business," but Congress failed to adopt his proposal. Hearings on H.R. 11,592 Be-
fore the House Comm. on Patents, 72d Cong. 15 (1932); see also Walter J. Derenberg, The
Problem of Trademark Dilution and the Antidilution Statutes, 44 CAL. L. REV. 439, 449-50
(1956) (describing the broad nature of Schechter's failed proposal to Congress in
1932); Frank I. Schechter, Fog and Fiction in Trade-Mark Protection, 36 COLUM. L. REV.
60, 84-85 (1936) (containing the full text of Schechter's proposal to Congress).
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ertheless constituted a wrong against the trademark's owner.
Therefore, according to Schechter, "the preservation of the
uniqueness of a trademark" was the only rational basis for the mark's
protection.29 Indeed, taking Schechter's proposal of divorcing trade-
mark rights from protecting consumer deception to its logical end
would inevitably lead to an in-gross right in the mark itself, limited
only by traditional property law.30
C. State Dilution Statutes and the Origins of the FFDA
Schechter's arguments were initially criticized and resisted
3' and it
took two decades before dilution made its formal entry into trade-
28 Schechter, supra note 22, at 825.
29 Id. at 831. Schechter was concerned that a diluted trademark would lose its "ef-
fectiveness and unique distinctiveness," thereby eroding the goodwill and capital a
company had invested in the trademark. Id. at 830. He argued:
The owner of a trade-mark who expends large sums of money in making his
mark known to the public as a symbol and guarantee of the excellence of the
quality of his product should receive the same protection from the courts for
his investment... that he would undoubtedly be entitled to receive for in-
vestment in plant or materials.
SCHECHTER, supra note 11, at 171.
30 Schechter, supra note 23, at 830. Although Schechter did not specifically de-
scribe his proposal as giving rise to trademark rights in gross, such rights would be ap-
parent in Schechter's own search for trademark rights no more limited than fights in
the physical assets of a business. Id. This notion of dilution theory creating an in-gross
property right in a trademark is the anticompetitive fear that concerns this Comment
and is the centerpiece of most dilution theory criticism. See Klieger, supra note 25, at
851-64 (arguing that dilution law gives rise to trademark rights in gross, which poses an
anticompetitive threat to market efficiency and consumer welfare); Kenneth L. Port,
The "Unnatural" Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal Dilution Statute Necessay ?, 18
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 433, 486-87 (1994) (opining that dilution theory not only pro-
tects a mark as if "copyrightable subject matter," but also protects how a mark is per-
ceived in the minds of the consumer, thereby creating "[m]onopolies in ideas in the
abstract" and thus enhancing the barrier to new competition in related and unrelated
markets); Brian Lerner, Note, Sneaking Through the Back Door with Pepperidge Farm: The
Monopoly Advantage of Dilution, 20 LoY. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 429, 455 (2000) (contending
that overbroad interpretations of dilution law creating trademark rights in gross, akin
to copyright and patent law, may lead to perpetual monopolies over common words
and generic shapes undeserving of legal protection); Jonathan Mermin, Note, Interpret-
ing the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: The Logic of the Actual Dilution Requirement,
42 B.C. L. REV. 207, 210 (2000) (commenting that the property-right-in-gross view of
trademark ownership is "in tension with the traditional justification for trademark pro-
tection in the United States, which is based not on the interests of the trademark
owner, but on the interests of consumers in the marketplace").
31 Schechter's thesis was called "radical" by one commentator. Beverly W. Pat-
tishall, The Dilution Rationale for Trademark-Trade Identity Protection, Its Progress and Pros-
pects, 71 Nw. U. L. REv. 618, 619 (1976).
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32mark law. In 1947, Massachusetts became the first state to codify the
theory of trademark dilution.33  The state's antidilution statute pro-
vided: "Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of
the distinctive quality of a trade name or trade-mark shall be a ground
for injunctive relief... notwithstanding the absence of competition
between the parties or of confusion as to the source of goods or serv-
ices. ,3 Other states followed Massachusetts's lead and by January
1996, when the FTDA was signed into law, a total of twenty-eight states
had adopted similar antidilution statutes.35
32 Terry Ahearn, Comment, Dilution by Blurring Under the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act of 1995: What Is It and How Is It Shown?, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 893, 898 (2001)
(describing dilution theory as catching on "slowly").
.43 Massachusetts's groundbreaking statute was passed just one year after the Lan-
ham Act of 1946, which provided federal trademark infringement protection. Lanham
Trade-Mark Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1051-1127 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)). While the Lanham Act focused on the
consumer confusion test, § 1 11 4 (l)(a), dilution fell outside the statute's jurisdiction,
supposedly sealing dilution theory's fate as a "mere footnote in the development of
trademark law," Klieger, supra note 25, at 810.
34 Act of May 2, 1947, ch. 307, § 7A, 1947 Mass. Acts 300 (codified as amended at
MASS. ANN. LAws ch. IIOB, § 12 (Law. Co-op. 1995)).
45 To date, there are thirty-four states that have antidilution laws. ALA. CODE § 8-
12-17 (1993); ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.180 (Michie 2000); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-
1448.01 (West Supp. 2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-71-213 (Michie Supp. 2001); CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE§ 14 330(a) (West Supp. 2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-11i(C)
(West Supp. 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 3313 (1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 495.151
(West 19 9 7 & Supp. 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-451 (b) (2000); IDAHO CODE § 48-513
(Michie 1997); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1036/65 (West 2001); IOWA CODE ANN. §
548.113 (West 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 81-214 (Supp. 2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
51:223.1 (West 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1530 (West 1997); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. IIOB, § 12 (Law. Co-op. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325D.165 (West 1995);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-25-25 (1999); MO. ANN. STAT. § 417.061 (West 2001); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 30-13-334 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-122 (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 350-A:12 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:3-13.20 (West Supp. 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
57-3B-15 (Michie Supp. 2000); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 360-1 (McKinney Supp. 2000);
OR. REV. STAT. § 647.107 (1983); 54 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1124 (West Supp. 1998);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-2-12 (1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-15-1165 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-512 (1995); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 16.29
(Vernon Supp. 2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.77.160 (West 1999); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 47-2-13 (Michie 1999); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-115 (Michie 2001). Colorado,
Michigan, and Ohio include dilution as part of their common law. Oswald, supra note
10, at 266 n.59.
State trademark dilution statutes can be divided into four categories: (1) those
that follow the United States Trademark Association (USTA) 1964 Model State
Trademark Bill; (2) those that follow the USTA 1988 Model State Trademark Bill; (3)
those that follow neither model, but follow a "variation" of the USTA 1964 Model Bill;
and (4) those that adopt the FTDA "as adapted for famous marks within a state." K.
Keith Facer, The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: A Whittling Away of State Dilution
Statutes, 10 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 863, 884-85 (2000). Arkansas is the only state so
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Despite the majority of states including antidilution provisions in
their statutes, however, the application of these laws created prob-
lems."' In particular, state dilution laws lacked uniformity and consis-
tency in their application which led to an uneven "patch-quilt system"
of state dilution jurisprudenceY This lack of harmonization and the
forum shopping it encouraged created calls to nationalize dilution
protection and to provide judicial uniformity.
D. The Scope and Provisions of the FnDA
"Under increasing pressure to provide uniform protection for
trademarks throughout the United States in order to facilitate [do-
mestic commerce and international trade] ,"
s Congress amended the
far to adopt the language of the FTDA. Id. at 885 n.92.
36 Courts were initially "reluctant, if not hostile," to apply state dilution laws.
Ahearn, supra note 32, at 900; see also Klieger, supra note 25, at 815-16 (pointing out
that the courts originally were hostile to state dilution statutes because of the difficulty
the courts had in defining dilution and determining when dilution had occurred). In
fact, between the years of 1933 and 1977, only one case effectively applied a state anti-
dilution statute. See Oswald, supra note 10, at 267 (discussing the Seventh Circuit case
Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc., 319 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1963)). It was not until Allied
Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1162 (N.Y. 1977), that the
dilution doctrine was "validated" in the courts and brought to the "forefront of conver-
sation in academic circles." Shanti, supra note 4, at 183-84.
37 141 CONG. REC. H14,310 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Moorhead); see also Madrid Protocol, supra note 20, at 128 (statement of Thomas E.
Smith) (stating that state laws lacked uniformity in the application of dilution theory);
H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995) ("Presently, the nature and extent of the remedies
against trademark dilution varies from state to state and, therefore, can provide un-
predictable and inadequate results for the trademark owner."), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030; MilesJ. Alexander & Michael K. Heilbronner, Dilution Under
Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act, 59 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93, 99 (1996) (stating that
state dilution standards have been interpreted unevenly).
38 William Marroletti, Dilution, Confusion, or Delusion? The Need for a Clear Interna-
tional Standard to Determine Trademark Dilution, 25 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 659, 674 (1999).
Uneven application of dilution standards in state courts and the inconsistent availabil-
ity of state antidilution statutes encouraged forum shopping for those courts which of-
fered the broadest trademark protection. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (stating that
federal legislation to protect famous trademarks against dilution was needed because
"famous marks ordinarily are used on a nationwide basis and dilution protection is
currently only available on a patch-quilt system of protection, in that only approxi-
mately 25 states have laws that prohibit trademark dilution"), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030; Nguyen, supra note 7, at 161 (discussing the "patchwork sys-
tem" of state laws and the resulting lack of uniformity). The lack of a nationwide rem-
edy for a trademark violation also made it virtually impossible for trademark owners
with multistate markets to seek injunctive relief in all fifty states. Kathleen B. McCabe,
Note, Dilution-bry-Blurring: A Theory Caught in the Shadow of Trademark Infringement, 68
FORDHAM L. REv. 1827, 1855 (2000). Further, foreign countries cited the absence of
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Lanham Act of 1946 to provide a federal cause of action for trade-
mark dilution.' With overwhelming approval and little debate,0 the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act was passed by the House of Repre-
sentatives on December 16, 1995,41 by the Senate on December 29,
1995, 42 and was signed into law on January 16, 1996. The FTDA pro-
vides federal protection of famous marks against dilution by the sub-
sequent and unauthorized use of others, regardless of whether the
mark is used on similar or noncompeting goods.43
According to the FTDA, dilution is "the lessening of the capacity
of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regard-
less of the presence or absence of-(1) competition between the
owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of con-
fusion, mistake, or deception."44 For a claim to be successful under
the FTDA, the plaintiff must first show that its mark is "famous.,
4
1
federal dilution relief in the United States as an excuse for their own lack of various
trademark protections, hindering the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations, to which the United States was a signatory,
and other multinational trade accords. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4, reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031; see also 141 CONG. REC. S19,310 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Hatch) ("[F]oreign countries are reluctant to change their laws to
protect famous U.S. marks if the United States does not afford special protection for
such marks."); 134 CONG. REC. S16,972 (1988) (statement of Sen. DeConcini) (noting
how a uniform dilution provision "would have demonstrated that we are willing to give
the same level of protection we are asking other countries to provide"), reprinted in U.S.
TRADEMARK ASs'N, THE TRADEMARK LAW REVISION ACT OF 1988, at 334 (1989); Facer,
supra note 35, at 879-81, 899-900 (detailing the United States' international intellectual
property obligations and U.S. companies' concerns regarding the absence of nation-
wide dilution protection).
39 See 134 CONG. REc. S16,972 (1988) (statement of Sen. DeConcini) ("A third ob-
jective of the Senate passed version was protection of truly famous trademarks from
dilution, which is unauthorized use that diminishes the distinctive quality of a mark."),
reprinted in U.S. TRADEMARK ASS'N, THE TRADEMARK LAW REvIsION ACT OF 1988, at 333
(1989). Representative Carlos Moorhead of California introduced the FTDA. H.R.
1295, 104th Cong. (1995).
40 See 4 McCARTHY, supra note 11, § 24:87, at 24-142 (stating that the Act "passed
rapidly through Congress with minimal hearings in the House and none in the Sen-
ate"). Ironically, the FTDA is identical to the proposed language of the 1988 Amend-
ment to the Lanham Act, which would have provided federal dilution protection. The
antidilution language, however, did not survive final debates in Congress and was re-
moved from the revision to the Lanham Act in 1988. Facer, supra note 35, at 879.
41 141 CONG. REC. H14,310 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995).
42 141 CONG. REC. S19,312 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995).
43 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. V 1999) (providing remedies for dilution of fa-
mous marks, including injunctive relief and, under certain circumstances, monetary
relief).
44 Id. § 1127.
45 Id. § 1125(c) (1). Included in the FTDA are eight nonexclusive and nonbinding
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Upon proving the trademark's fame and distinctiveness, the plaintiff is
then required to show that the defendant's mark "causes dilution of
the distinctive quality of the [plaintiffs] mark., 4, In this regard, the
federal statute substantially differs from most of its state counterparts,
which only require that a claimant prove a "likelihood of dilution" of
its trademark.47
II. THE THREE TYPES OF DILUTION
A. Cybersquatting
The three types of dilution that can occur under the FTDA are
cybersquatting, blurring, and tarnishment.48 The newest recognized
form of dilution, cybersquatting, is the diminishment of "the capacity
factors courts might employ in determining which marks qualify as "famous." They
include:
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; (B) the
duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or serv-
ices with which the mark is used; (C) the duration and extent of advertising
and publicity of the mark; (D) the geographical extent of the trading area in
which the mark is used; (E) the channels of trade for the goods or services
with which the mark is used; (F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the
trading areas and channels of trade used by the mark's owner and the person
against whom the injunction is sought; (G) the nature and extent of use of the
same or similar marks by third parties; and (H) whether the mark was regis-
tered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on
the principal register.
Id. § 1125(c)(1). For further discussion on the FTDA's fame requirement and its judi-
cial application, which is beyond the scope of this Comment, see Mark R. Becker,
Streamlining the Federal Trademark Dilution Act to Apply to Truly Famous Marks, 85 IOWA L.
REv. 1387 (2000) and Shanti, supra note 4.
46 d. § 1125(c) (1).
47 See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14330 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996) ("Likeli-
hood of... dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark.., shall be a ground for in-
junctive relief..'.."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 495.151 (West 1997 & Supp. 2001) (providing
for an injunctive remedy if "there exists a likelihood.., of dilution of the distinctive
quality of the [senior] mark .... ); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 368-d (McKinney 1996)
("Likelihood of... dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark.., shall be ground for
injunctive relief .... ); MODEL STATE TRADEMARK ACT § 12 (1964) ("Likelihood... of
dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark... shall be a ground for injunctive re-
lief .... ), reprinted in 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 22:8, at 22-22. This noticeable
distinction in word choice between the FFDA and state antidilution laws will be further
analyzed in Part lV.
48 Some commentators claim that alteration is another category of dilution, al-
though it appears to fall under tarnishment. See HALPERN ET AL., supra note 8, at 333-
34 (defining alteration as "when one entity in the process of comparative advertising
alters the trademark of another and presents it to consumers in that altered form
whether or not it is coupled with the intent to tarnish").
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of the [plaintiffs] marks to identify and distinguish [the plaintiffs]
goods and services on the Internet. ' '49 Cybersquatting is usually done
by a cyberspeculator who knowingly reserves a domain name merely
to sell it to the trademark holder for profit)0 In those situations, a
domain name is registered primarily to extract an exorbitant sum of
money from the unsuspecting trademark holder.5'
By ransoming unique domain names, cybersquatting can cause
diminishment when "potential customers cannot find a web page by
using a company's name or trademark.., in the top-level domain
'.com'." 2 Mistakenly accessing the defendant's website, prospective
users of the plaintiff's services may "'fail to continue to search for
plaintiffs own home page, due to anger, frustration, or the belief that
plaintiffs home page does not exist.' ' This can dilute the value of
the plaintiffs trademark by lessening the capacity of that mark to
market effectively the plaintiffs products through the Internet. 
4
49 Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1326 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting
Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1304 (C.D. Cal. 1996)). Panavi-
sion was the first federal circuit court decision to recognize cybersquatting as a form of
dilution distinct from blurring and tarnishment.
50 Kimberley A. O'Meara, Note, Avery Dennison v. Sumpton: The Ninth Circuit
Raises the Bar for Successful Dilution Claims in Domain Name Cases, 20 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.
REV. 61, 76-77 (2000); see also Jennifer Golinveaux, What's in a Domain Name: Is "Cyber-
squatting" Trademark Dilution?, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 641, 647 (1999) (discussing the modus
operandi of typical cybersquatters).5' See Elizabeth Robison Martin, Note, "Too Famous to Live Long!" The Anticyber-
squatting Consumer Protection Act Sets Its Sights to Eliminate Cybersquatter Opportunistic
Claims on Domain Names, 31 ST. MARY'S LJ. 797, 813 (2000) ("Cybersquatting involves
only those situations where a domain name is registered for the sole purpose of extort-
ing money.").
52 O'Meara, supra note 50, at 77.
53 Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1430, 1435
(S.D.N.Y. 1997); see also Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1327 (affirming the district court's find-
ing that dilution occurs when "potential customers of [the plaintiff] will be discour-
aged if they cannot find its web page by typing in 'Panavision.com,' but instead are
forced to wade through hundreds of web sites");Jews forJesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp.
282, 306 (D.N.J. 1998) (quoting Bucci); Teletech Customer Care Mgmt., Inc. v. Tele-
Tech Co., Inc., 977 F. Supp. 1407, 1410 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (finding that use of a search
engine can generate as many as one thousand matches and it is "likely to deter web
browsers from searching for Plaintiffs [sic] particular website").
54 See Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1240 (N.D. 11. 1996) ("[De-
fendant's] registration of the intermatic.com domain name lessens the capacity of In-
termatic to identify and distinguish its goods and services by means of the Internet.");
see also Jennifer Mae Slonaker, Comment, Conflicting Interpretations of the Federal Trade-
mark Dilution Act Create Inadequate Famous Mark Protection, 26 U. DAYFON L. REV. 121,
130 (2000) ("if the [web]site is not valid ... the trademark's established goodwill can
be diluted either by frustrated users who give tip on trying to locate the trademarked
good or service and cannot find the proper cite, or by the association of the trademark
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Congress has recently entered the cybersquatting arena by passing
The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) on Novem-
ber 29, 1999.5 The ACPA "prohibit[s] the bad-faith and abusive regis-
tration of distinctive marks as Internet domain names with the intent
to profit from the goodwill associated with such marks.5 6 The Act
provides a federal cause of action against a person who profits from
the goodwill of a trademark if he or she knowingly uses a domain
name that is "identical, confusingly similar to, or dilutive of a trade-
mark" that is distinctive at the time the domain name was registered.5 ,
Like the FTDA, the ACPA is not intended to protect Internet con-
sumers per se but to provide trademark owners protection for the use
of their trademarks as domain names in cyberspace.
B. Tarnishment
Dilution by tarnishment occurs when the association created by
the junior 59 holder's commercial use of the mark tarnishes, degrades,
or corrupts the senior holder's mark.6 Tarnishment thus protects the
with an altogether different good or service ....").
55 S. 1948, 106th Cong. Title III, § 3001 (a) (1999), reprinted in 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(113 Stat. 1501A-545 to -552). The Act was included in a larger intellectual property
law package, entitled the Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform
Act (IPCORA). S. 1948, 106th Cong. (1999), reprinted in 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N. (113 Stat.
1501A-521).
56 S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 4 (1999). While the ACPA was passed in 1999, Congress
had cybersquatting concerns dating back to the time of the FTDA's passage in 1995.
See 141 CONG. REc. S19,312 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
("[T]his antidilution statute can help stem the use of deceptive Internet addresses
taken by those who are choosing marks that are associated with the products and repu-
tations of others.").
57 S. REP. No. 106-140, at 2 (1999).
58 For further discussion on cybersquatting and the ACPA, see generally Gregory
B. Blasbalg, Comment, Masters of Their Domains: Trademark Holders Now Have New Ways
to Control Their Marks in Cyberspace, 5 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 563 (2000); Oscar S.
Cisneros, Note, Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 15 BERKELEYTECH. L.J. 229
(2000); and Diane K. Wong, Note, Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 15 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 245 (2000).
59 For purposes of this Comment, the modifying term 'Junior" refers to a subse-
quent user (the defendant) or use of the famous trademark at issue, while "senior"
holder or user refers to the plaintiff.
CI See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1326 n.7 (9th Cir. 1998)
("Tarnishment occurs when a famous mark is improperly associated with an inferior or
offensive product or service."). The development of a remedy for tarnishment is at-
tributed to Rudolf Callmann. See 3A RUDOLF CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 21.11, at 67-68 (Louis Altman ed., 4th
ed. 1983) (characterizing the refusal to recognize a cause of action for dilution and
tarnishment as a "sad commentary" and suggesting a property remedy for such causes).
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strength of the senior user's mark from erosion by preventing the
wholesome and unique association of the mark that the senior user
enjoys from being shared with an unsavory and distasteful product or
service. This "erosion" by tarnishment often takes the form of a par-
ody on another's famous commercial mark,6' but tarnishment can also
62occur through pornographic uses.
To prove a dilution-by-tarnishment claim, the plaintiff first must
show that the unauthorized use is an attempt to link the plaintiffs fa-
mous mark with "products of shoddy quality, or is portrayed in an un-
wholesome or unsavory context, ,63 and second prove that plaintiff's
mark will suffer negative and unflattering associations through the de-
fendant's use of its degrading mark,64 causing damage to the senior
user's creation of a positive image in its trademark.'
5
C. Blurring
Dilution-by-blurring is the most common dilution claim
and the most difficult to prove. 6  It is the "classic form of
61 Examples include a T-shirt bearing the logo "Mutant of Omaha," see Mutual of
Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 398 (8th Cir. 1987) (upholding the district
court's finding of a likelihood of confusion between Mutual of Omaha's trademarks
and the defendant's T-shirt design), and a red-and-white poster with script identical to
the Coca-Cola logo that reads "Enjoy Cocaine," see Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising,
Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1186 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (relying on dilution by tarnishment as an
alternative basis for issuance of preliminary injunction against defendant's poster); see
also McCabe, supra note 38, at 1843 (citing the same examples).
(12 See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200,
203 (2d Cir. 1979) (involving the use of plaintiff's distinctive uniform in the X-rated
movie, Debbie Does Dallas); Hasbro Inc. v. Internet Entm't Group, 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1479,
1480 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (holding that plaintiffs children's game "Candy Land" was
tarnished by defendant's use of www.candyland.com as a sexually explicit Internet
site); Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124, 135 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (finding
a likelihood that the depiction of Pillsbury's trade characters, Poppin' Fresh and Pop-
pie Fresh, engaging in sexual intercourse "could injure the business reputation of
[Pillsbury] or dilute the distinctive quality of its trademark").
69 Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994).
64 Clinique Labs., Inc. v. Dep Corp., 945 F. Supp. 547, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (find-
ing no tarnishment of plaintiff's Clinique mark because defendant was not attempting
to associate plaintiff's products with "obscenity or sexual or illegal activity," the defen-
dant's product line was neither "shoddy or unwholesome," and "no evidence suggests
that Clinique's trademark or trade dress will suffer negative associations through de-
fendant's use of its mark").
65 Ameritech, Inc. v. Am. Info. Techs. Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 965 (6th Cir. 1987)
("This kind of infringement corrodes the senior user's interest in the trademark ... by
damaging positive associations that have attached to it.").
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. f (1995) (noting
the nebulous character of blurring in that "[d]irect evidence of a dilution of distinct-
[Vol. 150: 719
PREVENTING DILU7ION OF THE FFDA
• • • 68
dilution"6'7 that Schechter is credited with originating, and which the
FTDA primarily seeks to proscribe. 9 Blurring occurs when a con-
sumer views a junior, unauthorized use of a senior, famous mark and
is reminded of the famous mark, even though she knows that the sen-
ior user is not the source of the junior user's goods.0 Hypothetical
examples of dilution-by-blurring include the use of "Brooks Brothers"
on office equipment, "Budweiser" on hair products, and "Rollerblade"
on musical instruments.7
While the consumer recognizes that the senior user has not spon-
sored the usually noncompeting junior use of the mark, the strength
of the mark as a "unique identifier" of the senior holder's goods (that
is, the trademark's selling power) is nevertheless adversely affected, as
over time buyers will come to see the senior mark as being associated
with several products, none of which belong to the senior user.72 The
consumer's mental connection of a famous mark with one product
(or line of products) may therefore be "blurred" because the mark's
association is now shared between two or more products.
73
For example, although no confusion would result from the use of
"Nissan" on aspirin and pianos, the consumer would be slower to con-
clude that the Nissan mark is for cars because it has been blurred by
the aspirin and pianos.4 This is Schechter's "gradual whittling away"
iveness is seldom available because the harm at issue is a blurring of the mental asso-
ciations evoked by the mark, a phenomenon not easily sampled by consumer surveys
and not normally manifested by unambiguous consumer behavior").
67 Ahearn, supra note 32, at 896.
68 See id. at 897 ("What Professor Schechter described in [his 1927 law review arti-
cle] would later become known as the concept of dilution." (citation omitted)).
See H.R. REp. No. 104-374, at 2 (1995) ("[T]he purpose of [the FTDA] is to pro-
tect famous trademarks from subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of the
mark...." (emphasis added)), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1029.
70 4 McCARTHY, supra note 11, § 24:68, at 24-120.
71 See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. H14,317 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Moorhead) (using "Dupont shoes, Buick aspirin, and Kodak pianos" as blurring ex-
amples).
72 McCabe, supra note 38, at 1842.
73 See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 458 (4th Cir. 1999) (requiring a plaintiff to show on a dilution-by-
blurring claim "a sufficient similarity between the junior and senior marks to evoke an
'instinctive mental association' of the two by a relevant universe of consumers"); see also
Reichman, supra note 12, at 112-13 ("[F]or dilution to occur, it is by definition neces-
sary for the consumer to make a mental association between the two marks even
though no confusion exists."). Indeed, true dilution-by-blurring occurs before the con-
sumer is confused-the perceived injury is not to consumers but to the mark itself. 4
MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 24:68, at 24-120.
74 See Reichman, supra note 12, at 114 (giving examples, including Rolls-Royce
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of a trademark's distinctive quality,75 suffering "death by a thousand
cuts."
76
III. CURRENT DILUTION THEORYJURISPRUDENCE
While one of the intents of the nationalization of antidilution in
the FTDA was to eliminate inconsistencies in trademark protection,"
federal dilution jurisprudence has been far from consistent.7 s Even
with Congress's attempt to instill uniform understanding of dilution
law through its enactment of the FTDA, courts continually struggle
with the concept of dilution. As one commentator has observed, "this
judicial discord has resulted in confusion and has led to disparate in-
terpretations of the FTDA."
7
Inconsistent and unpredictable standards may become more evi-
dent if courts continue to interpret the FTDA by "importing the same
misunderstandings that have plagued... federal courts' treatment of
state law dilution cases." s° This has already caused concern in deci-
candy).
Schechter, supra note 23, at 825. Schechter's article had the example of the use
of the Rolls-Royce mark on noncompeting goods, eventually leading to the inability of
Rolls-Royce to signify quality automobiles even if consumers did not believe that the
car company produced the other goods. Id. at 829-30.
See Coca-Cola Co. v. Stewart, 621 F.2d 287, 292 (8th Cir. 1980) (predicting that a
holding that Coca-Cola failed the jurisdictional test "would imply that local infringers
could pirate a national mark... inflicting 'death by a thousand cuts' upon the trade-
mark holder").
7 Supra text accompanying note 38.
78 Some blame this jurisprudential inconsistency on the writers of the FTDA:
"When a statute [such as the FTDA] is vague, resulting in a right that is vague and im-
possible to articulate, courts will always be inconsistent in their application of that
right." Port, supra note 30, at 454. Others blame the courts, not for incorrectly inter-
preting the FTDA per se, but for confusing trademark infringement with trademark
dilution. See McCabe, supra note 38, at 1865 (observing that courts typically reinsert an
irrelevant confusion standard in their analysis of dilution claims, causing dilution to
"fall prey ... to doctrinal murkiness"); Port, supra note 30, at 460 (noting that courts
have had a very difficult time severing dilution analysis from trademark infringement
analyis even though both theories are "mutually exclusive").
Lerner, supra note 30, at 44243.
Lori Krafte-Jacobs, Comment, Judicial Interpretation of the Federal Trademark Dilu-
tion Act of 1995, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 659, 694 (1998). For example, cases where the
court was unwilling to find dilution unless the use was noncompetitive and nonconfus-
ing, see, e.g., Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201 (1st
Cir. 1983) ("[Plaintiff] must produce sufficient evidence to support a finding of either
... injury to the value of the mark caused by actual or potential customer confusion
[or] injury resulting from use of the mark ... that detracts from, draws on, or other-
wise appropriates the goodwill and reputation associated with plaintiffs mark .... ),
should not be followed by courts interpreting the FTDA. The Act plainly states that
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sions interpreting a plaintiffs evidentiary burden under the FTDA.
The FTDA provides relief only when the junior mark "causes dilution
of the distinctive quality of the [plaintiffs] mark, 81 suggesting that a
plaintiff must prove actual dilution before recovery. In this respect,
the FIDA differs from state statutes, which normally allow for relief
simply by demonstrating a "likelihood of dilution. '' 2
Courts have differed over whether the phrase "causes dilution" in
the FTDA means that the plaintiff must show actual dilution or merely
establish that the defendant's conduct will likely dilute the senior
user's trademark. This disagreement regarding the FTDA's standard
of proof has resulted in a circuit split. The Fourth Circuit in Ringling
Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel De-
velopment.1s stated that a plaintiff must show actual dilution in order to
prevail on a trademark dilution claim under the FTDA.84 The Second
85
Circuit, on the other hand, in Nabisco, Inc. v. PFBrands, Inc., refused
to follow the Fourth Circuit's analysis in Ringling Bros. and instead
concluded that the claimant need only show an inference of likely di-
lution to prevail s.
dilution may be found "regardless of the presence or absence of... competition ... or
... likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. V 1999).
Moreover, post-FTFDA courts should not draw on cases that insisted on predicating di-
lution on a traditional "likelihood of confusion" showing, since no such terminology is
used in the FTDA, and such analysis is strictly for trademark infringement claims. Cf
I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 50 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that the cor-
rect standard for determining dilution through blurring is whether target customers
are likely to view the plaintiff's product and the defendant's product as "essentially the
same," a requirement which contradicts the language of the FTDA); AHP Subsidiary
Holding Co. v. Stuart Hale Co., I F.3d 611, 619 (7th Cir. 1993) (concluding that under
modern state precedent the likelihood of confusion standard used for infringement is
the same as the standard used for dilution). The difference between state dilution
statutes that include this "likelihood of confusion" language and the FTDA will be fur-
ther discussed in Part IV.
81 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (Supp. V 1999).
82 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 24:80, at 24-135. The FTDA's language also dif-
fers from the 1964 USTA Model Bill, which permitted relief in the face of a
"[l]ikelihood of injury to business reputation or ... dilution." United States Trade-
mark Association Model State Trademark Bill § 12, reninted in 3 MCCARTHY, supra note
11, § 22:8, at 22-22; see also supra text accompanying note 47 (noting this difference be-
tween the FIDA and state antidilution statutes).
83 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999).
84 Id. at 461.
85 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999).
R11 Id. at 223-24.
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A. Ringling Bros. and the Actual Dilution Test
Ringling Bros. has promoted its circus as "The Greatest Show on
Earth" since 1872, obtaining federal registration for the trademark
slogan in 1961.87 A Utah state agency, the Utah Division of Travel De-
velopment ("Utah"), began using its slogan, "The Greatest Snow on
Earth," as early as 1962 in an effort to promote winter tourist attrac-
tions in the state and received state registration in 197588 and federal
registration in 1997. ' Ringling Bros. brought an action against Utah
under the FTDA alleging dilution of its "Greatest Show on Earth"
trademark."
1. District Court Decision
Ringling Bros. attempted to establish dilution merely by demon-
strating a mental association between the two similar marks by con-
sumers, but the district court held that dilution required more than a
mere association: it also required that the association cause actual
harm to the senior mark's capacity to identify and distinguish goods
and services.9' Applying this standard, the district court found that
Ringling Bros.'s consumer survey evidence failed to establish actual
harm."' Therefore, the court ruled that Ringling Bros., while success-
87 Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 451. Ringling Bros. spent approximately $19 million
during the fiscal year ending in 1997 to advertise its trademark slogan in print advertis-
ing, radio, television, videos, outdoor billboards, direct-mail, press announcements,
posters, program books, souvenirs, and joint promotions with other companies. Id.
Utah has primarily used its mark on motor vehicle license plates. Id.
89 Id. at 451-52. Federal registration of Utah's slogan was granted in 1997 after an
unsuccessful opposition by Ringling Bros. Id. It was only after this unsuccessful oppo-
sition that Ringling Bros. brought its federal dilution suit against Utah. Ringling Bros.-
Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 935 F. Supp. 763,
764 (E.D. Va. 1996).
90 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 955 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Va. 1997).
9I Id. at616.
92 Ringling Bros.'s survey asked consumers to complete the statement, "The
Greatest __ on Earth." Id. at 612. Among the results, 21% of Utah respondents filled
in "Show" and associated that phrase with Ringling Bros. and also completed the
statement with "Snow" and associated that slogan with Utah; for non-Utah residents,
fewer than 0.5% of respondents did the latter. Id. at 612-13. While only 25% of the
Utah respondents, compared to 41% nationwide, associated the incomplete statement
solely with Ringling Bros., id. at 616, the district court concluded that this evidence
only indicated that Utah's mark was widely known in Utah and not that the residents of
Utah associated the mark with Ringling Bros. Id. at 617-18. In fact, the surveys showed
that 46% of respondents in Utah, compared to 41% elsewhere, associated the "Great-
est Show on Earth" mark with Ringling Bros. Id. at 618. Based on this evidence, the
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fully showing that its slogan qualified as a "famous" mark under the
FTDA,9 3 had failed to prove dilution since it could not show by direct
evidence that Utah's use of its "Greatest Snow on Earth" mark less-
ened the demand for Ringling Bros.'s entertainment services and the
914
capacity of its mark to identify and distinguish its circus.
2. Fourth Circuit Opinion
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower
court's ruling that Ringling Bros. had failed to prove dilution of its
"Greatest Show on Earth" mark. The court interpreted the FTDA to
require actual economic harm to a mark's selling power demonstrated
by evidence that the defendant's use of the junior mark had in fact
caused such a loss.95
Comparing the FTDA's "causes dilution" language with that found
in state antidilution laws, which proscribe the use of famous marks
when they are likely to cause dilution, the court concluded that the
FTDA required actual, consummated dilution.96 Because the FTDA
emphasizes the "capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish
its goods and services,"" the court found that the harm the FTDA
sought to remedy, unlike the state statutes, was a loss of selling power,
rather than a loss of distinctiveness." Interpreting the FTDA to pro-
tect the latter would lead, the court believed, to granting trademark
owners property rights in gross simply on the grounds of similarity.!
district court held that the capacity of Ringling Bros.'s slogan to identify and distin-
guish the circus was just as strong within Utah as it was outside of Utah. Id. at 617.
93 Id. at 613.
94 Id. at 618.
95 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 170 F.3d 449,461 (4th Cir. 1999).
96 Id. at 458.
97 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. V 1999).
98 Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 458. Proving dilution requires that there be an "ac-
tual lessening of the senior mark's selling power, expressed as 'its capacity to identify
and distinguish goods or services."' Id.
99 Id. at 459. The court also refused to allow a presumption of actual economic
harm based only on the similarity of the marks because similarity in and of itself does
not create a high enough probability of actual economic harm as required under the
FTDA. Id. at 459-60. Such a presumption could not be made, the court stated, be-
cause there could be other reasons a mark could lose its distinctiveness rather than the
junior's use of the mark. Id. at 459. Indeed, because of factors such as lack of expo-
sure or general consumer disinterest in the products used in connection with the
marks, the court stated that it was possible that some junior uses would have no harm-
ful effect at all upon a senior mark's economic value. Id. at 460.
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Since Ringling Bros.'s survey evidence was designed only to show
mental association and not actual economic harm (as it only asked
consumers to complete the statement, "The Greatest _ on Earth"),
the court held that Ringling Bros. had failed to prove that its trade-
mark slogan's selling power had been damaged by Utah.'00 Therefore,
Ringling Bros. did not meet all of the FTDA's requirements necessary
to show that Utah's "Greatest Snow on Earth" slogan caused dilu-
tion. I
B. Nabisco, Goldfish, and the Likelihood of Dilution Standard
Pepperidge Farms has produced goldfish-shaped, bite-sized
cheese crackers continuously since 1962 and has obtained "numer-
ous" trademark registrations for its "Goldfish" cracker design. 0 2 Na-
bisco also began selling animal-shaped crackers, starting in 1998, as
part of a licensing agreement to promote Nickelodeon Television's
"CatDog" cartoon program. Nabisco's product contained three
character shapes based on the cartoon. One quarter of the crackers
were shaped and colored like Pepperidge Farms' Goldfish cracker, al-
though Nabisco's fish cracker had markings on its side and was some-
what larger and flatter. 0 4 Seeking to stop Nabisco's production of its
"CatDog" crackers, Pepperidge Farms filed suit claiming, in part, that
Nabisco had violated the FTDA.
1. District Court Opinion
The district court applied a six-factor test for dilution-by-blurring,
a test first developed by Judge Sweet in his concurring opinion in
Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, Inc.115 The six factors of
the Mead Data test consist of the following: "(1) similarity of the
marks, (2) similarity of the products covered by the marks, (3) sophis-
tication of consumers, (4) predatory intent, (5) renown of the senior
mark, and (6) renown of the junior mark."'" The district court found
100 Id. at 462-63.
101 Id. at 463.
Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 212 (2d Cir. 1999). Between
1995 and 1998, Pepperidge Farms spent more than $120 million marketing its Gold-
fish crackers. Id. at 213.
103 Id. at 213.
104 Id.
105 Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1035 (2d Cir.
1989) (Sweet,J., concurring).
106 Id.
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that each of these six factors weighed in favor of finding dilution.
7
Finding that Pepperidge Farms would likely prevail on both its federal
and state antidilution claims, the district court granted a preliminary
injunction against Nabisco's production of its animal crackers.
2. Second Circuit Decision
Declining to follow the "actual consummated harm" standard of
Ringling Bros., which the court viewed as dependent on "excessive lit-
eralism to defeat the intent of the statute,''." the Second Circuit af-
firmed the district court's finding that Pepperidge Farms would likely
succeed on its dilution claim."0 Noting that relief under the FTDA is
limited to injunctions (absent willfulness), the court held that waiting
for actual dilution to occur would result in an uncompensated injury
and would also be disadvantageous for the defendant who would want
to know prior to investing in a mark whether that mark causes dilu-
tion."' The court also rejected the Fourth Circuit's economic loss re-
quirement, finding it "an arbitrary and unwarranted limitation on the
methods of proof" 2 and instead opted for a "likelihood of dilution"
test akin to that used under state antidilution laws."
3
Deciding not to adopt the lower court's use of the Mead Data test
for establishing dilution, the Second Circuit constructed a ten-factor,
nonexhaustive, and nonexclusive test for establishing a likelihood of
dilution: (1) distinctiveness, (2) similarity of the marks, (3) proximity
of the products and likelihood of bridging the gap, (4) interrelation-
ship between the first three factors, (5) shared consumers and geo-
graphic limitations, (6) sophistication of consumers, (7) actual confu-
sion, (8) adjectival or referential quality of the junior use, (9) harm to
the junior user and delay by the senior user, and (10) the effect of
senior user's prior laxity in protecting 
the mark."
4
Emphasizing the interdependent relationship of the first three
factors, the court ruled in favor of Pepperidge Farms. The court gave
107 Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 188, 205-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
10s Id. at 212.
109 Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224.
110 Id. at 228-29.
H] Id. at 224.
112 Id. at 223.
"1 Id. at 224-25. The court noted that no matter how obvious the dilution, if the
plaintiff were required to show actual revenue loss, a senior user might never be able
to show causation. Id. at 223-24.
114 Id. at 217-22.
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more weight to the similarity and proximity factors than to the Gold-
fish shape, which the court conceded was somewhat arbitrarily se-
lected." 5  The court also held that "shared consumers" of the two
products would be likely," 6 and that if Nabisco's crackers were placed
in a bowl, the fish-shaped crackers would be confusingly similar to
Pepperidge Farms' goldfish, despite the fact that they are "referential"
to the CatDog cartoon.1 7 The Second Circuit ultimately found that,
on balance, Pepperidge Farms had established it would likely prevail
in its dilution claim, and upheld the lower court's injunction.""
C. Post-Ringling Bros./Nabisco Jurisprudence
Since the Ringling Bros. and Nabisco rulings there have been four
notable federal appellate decisions" that have taken up the question
of whether the FTDA requires the claimant to show actual harm or
115 Id. at 219-20.
116 Id. at 220.
117 Id. at 222. The Nabisco court's acceptance of the likelihood of consumer confu-
sion as evidence of trademark dilution completely undermines its decision and con-
tradicts the theory of dilution. Although the Second Circuit noted that consumer con-
fusion is "unnecessary" to a successful dilution claim, it "suggested that it would
nevertheless be evidence of dilution." Mermin, supra note 30, at 233 (quoting the Na-
bisco decision, 191 F.3d at 219, which stated that "[a] junior use that confuses consum-
ers as to which mark is which surely dilutes the distinctiveness of the senior mark").
The likelihood of consumer confusion is evidence of infringement, not of dilution. See
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. V 1999) ("The term 'dilution' means the lessening of the ca-
pacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods and services, regardless of
the presence or absence of... likelihood of confusion .... ); 4 MCCARTHY, supra note
11, § 24:70, at 24-123 (observing that an unauthorized junior use of an established
mark "can cause confusion in some people's minds and in other people's minds cause
dilution by blurring. But in no one person's mind can both perceptions occur at the
same time. Either a person thinks that the similarly branded goods or services come
from a common source (or are connected or affiliated) or not"); Mermin, supra note
30, at 234 ("If Congress had intended consumer confusion to be a factor that pointed
toward a finding of dilution, it would have made no sense to include in the definition
of dilution [in the FTDA] an express declaration of its irrelevance."). Consumers at a
cocktail party who are confused as to the source of similarly shaped fish crackers"swimming" in the same dish is evidence only of trademark infringement, a tort de-
signed to prevent such consumer confusion, and has no relevance to an FTDA claim.
118 Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 228-29.
119 While there is no Ninth Circuit case addressing the issue of whether the FTDArequires a demonstration of actual dilution or likelihood of dilution, the Ninth Circuit
did affirm, without opinion, the denial of a preliminary injunction in Playboy Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (C.D. Cal. 1999), which
followed Ringling Bros.'s actual harm requirement. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape
Communications Corp., No. 99-56230, No. 99-56231, 202 F.3d 278 (unpublished table
opinion), 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 30215 (9th Cir. Nov. 19, 1999); see also infra note 124
(mentioning the subsequent history of the district court Playboy case).
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only likelihood of dilution: Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas
Sports News, L.L. C.,12 0 Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc.,' Eli
122
Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., and V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Mose-
ey.123 While the Westchester Media court chose to follow the Fourth Cir-
cuit's actual harm test, the courts in the other three cases opted to use
the Second Circuit's likelihood of dilution standard, further exacer-
bating the divide over proper interpretation and adjudication under
the FTDA1
2 4
120 212 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2000).
121 214 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 2000).
122 233 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2000).
123 259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2001).
124 This Part does not discuss the following federal dilution cases decided in the
First and Ninth Circuits since the FTDA was not analyzed by these courts: LP. Lund
TradingApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 33, 47, 50 (1st Cir. 1998), reasoning that a show-
ing of actual harm is not required, but avoiding application of the FTDA and determi-
nation of how dilution had to be proven in plaintiff's case since the court was unsure
of the FTDA's applicability with regard to trade dress claims and plaintiff's mark was
determined not to be famous; Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1326 (9th
Cir. 1998), making no distinction between the requirements of the FITDA and Califor-
nia's antidilution law and deriving its definition of dilution by blurring from a case de-
cided under a state antidilution statute enacted before the FTDA; Avery Dennison Carp.
v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 1999), citing Panavision for the standard under
which the FTDA would grant relief for dilution, thereby using a pre-FTFDA, state likeli-
hood of dilution standard. This Part also leaves out the Eighth Circuit decision
reached in Luigino's, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 170 F.3d 827, 832-33 (8th Cir. 1999), since
that court failed to clarify in its decision whether actual dilution or likelihood of dilu-
tion must be shown, or what degree of dilution a plaintiff must demonstrate in order
to prevail. For district court cases outside the Fourth Circuit that follow Ringling Bros.'s
actual dilution test, see Kellogg Co. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10059, at
*31-33 (W.D. Tenn. 2001), citing Congress's use of the present tense "causes," in light
of preexisting state statutes addressing "likelihood," to justify an actual dilution stan-
dard; Carnival Corp. v. SeaEscape Casino Cruises, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1263 (S.D. Fla.
1999), rejecting the allegation that the defendant's slogan, "SeaEscape to a Ship Full of
Fun!" diluted the plaintiff's "Fun Ship" mark; American Cyanamid Co. v. Nutraceutical
Corp., 54 F. Supp. 2d 379, 392-93 (D.N.J. 1999), finding that the defendant's use of la-
bels incorporating colors of the visual spectrum did not dilute similar labels used by
the plaintiff because the labels were not sufficiently similar and plaintiff failed to offer
any evidence that its selling power was actually lessened; Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape
Communications Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1076 (C.D. Cal. 1999), holding that plain-
tiff's "Playboy" and "Playmate" trademarks were not diluted by defendant's sale of
these words to banner advertisers as search engine terms due to insufficiency of plain-
tiff's showing of actual economic harm, affd, 202 F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 1999); National
Football League Properties, Inc. v. Prostyle, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 665, 671 (E.D. Wis. 1999),
holding that survey evidence which only shows the marks' similarity in isolation is in-
sufficient to show dilution and that such evidence must allow a reasonable inference
that the junior mark's use has caused actual harm to the senior mark's selling power.
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1. Times Mirror and the Third Circuit
Times Mirror has used its mark "The Sporting News" as the title of
its weekly publication devoted to hockey, football, basketball, and
baseball. 1 5 Its phrase was granted federal trademark protection in
1886.' 26 The Sporting News does not provide any information, articles,
or advertisements on gambling.
27
The defendant publishes Las Vegas Sporting News, which contains
articles, editorials, and advertisements on sports wagering for "gaming
enthusiasts. The defendant changed the name of its publication in
1997 from Las Vegas Sports News to Las Vegas Sporting News because the
previous publisher had a poor reputation in the gambling community
and the term "sporting" more accurately reflected the publication's
gaming content. 12 At the time the defendant changed the name of its
publication, the publisher was familiar with the plaintiff's sports tab-
loid. "' ° After the defendant's refusal to comply with the plaintiffs
cease and desist letter, the plaintiff filed suit, charging, in part, trade-
mark dilution under the FTDA.1
3
1
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's rul-
ing granting Times Mirror a preliminary injunction. The court found
no error in the district court's use of the six-factor Mead Data test to
find that the plaintiff was likely to prevail on its dilution claim. 32 In
addition, the court incorporated the supplemental dilution factors es-
poused in Nabisco in its analysis to substantiate the lower court's hold-
ing. 3
Agreeing with the district court that irreparable harm may be
proven without showing actual injury to the plaintiff's bottom line, the
court sided with the Second Circuit and rejected the Fourth Circuit's
position with respect to the standard of proof required under the
FTDA.'13  Rather than evaluating whether the defendant's publication
actually harmed the plaintiff's use of its trademark slogan, the court
ruled that it was sufficient for Times Mirror to show that the "'likeli-
125 212 F.3d at 160-61.
126 Id. at 160.




131 Id. at 161-62.
132 Id. at 169.
133 Id. at 168-69.
134 Id. at 169.
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hood that [defendant's] use of Las Vegas Sporting News lessens the ca-
pacity of The Spurting News to identify and distinguish Times Mirror's
goods or services"' in order to prevail in its claim.
2. Westchester Media and the Fifth Circuit
PRL owns a family of "Polo" trademarks for its multibillion-dollar
company that sells clothing, accessories, home furnishings, and fra-
grances.' 36 PRL has federally registered a number of trademarks that
include the word "Polo."137 Westchester Media's "Polo" magazine en-
tered the market in 1997 as the relaunch of a magazine that previously
focused solely on the sport of polo. "" The former "Polo" magazine,
founded in 1975, was "an insider's view of the sport of polo" and had
been endorsed by the United States Polo Association as its official
publication.'3 1' PRL had no complaints about sharing its mark with the
former magazine. 4  In fact, it advertised in the old magazine and
PRL's founder, Ralph Lauren, consented to be interviewed for an ar-
ticle that appeared therein."'
Under new ownership, the defendant relaunched its magazine in,,,14 2
1997 in an effort to "expand readership and broaders polo's appeal.
The new magazine was, according to its new publisher, "not about the
sport, but rather about an adventurous approach to living life."
143 PRL
objected to the revamping of the magazine's image and targeted
audience and responded to Westchester's suit seeking declaratory
judgment that Westchester's magazine title does not infringe PRL's
"Polo" trademark with a trademark dilution claim against West-
chester's use of the word "Polo.'
'144
While the lower court declined to address PRL's dilution argu-
ment because PRL's requested relief under the dilution claim was the
same as that for its infringement claim,
145 the Fifth Circuit took the
135 Id. at 168-69 (quoting the district court opinion).
136 Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 661 (5th Cir.
2000).
137 Id.
3 8 Id. at 661-62.
139 Id. at 661.
140 Id. at 661-62.
141 Id. at 662.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 663.
145 Id. at 669.
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opportunity to decide "an issue of first impression" and clarify its
stance on what must be proven to make out a FTDA claim. 41
Noting the difference in express language between state antidilu-
tion statutes and the FTDA itself, the court endorsed the "Fourth Cir-
cuit's holding that the FTDA requires proof of actual harm since this
standard best accords with the plain meaning of' the Act, and con-
cluded that the FTDA requires a showing of actual harm. 47 Determin-
ing that the lower court did not err in finding that PRL made no
demonstration of actual economic injury from the current and pro-
jected circulation of the new "Polo" magazine, the court ruled that
PRL's antidilution claim was "doomed.'
48
3. Eli Lilly and the Seventh Circuit
Eli Lilly is a global pharmaceutical corporation that sells PROZAC,
a popular prescription drug used to treat clinical depression. 4 1
PROZAC first appeared on pharmacists' shelves in 1988 and eleven
years later was named one of the top six "health and grooming" prod-
ucts of the 20th Century according to Fortune magazine. 5° The drug
"has been prescribed over 240 million times for 17 million Americans,
generating sales of more than $12 billion.' 5'
Natural Answers is an Internet company which develops and mar-
kets a line of herbal dietary supplements called Herbscriptions which
are sold exclusively on Natural Answers's website.12 Herbscriptions
are intended to be alternatives (not substitutes) to drugs and include
such "natural" products as HerbenolPM, HERBALIUM,
HERBASPIRIN, and HERBADRYL.15 The name of each Herbscrip-
tion product was chosen in order to "call to mind the function of a
famous drug from which its name is derived.' 54 Natural Answers also
develops an herbal "mood elevator" which the company named
146 Id. at 670. In Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 205 n.8 (5th
Cir. 1998), the Fifth Circuit had avoided analysis of the plaintiff's dilution claim be-
cause it determined that all of the plaintiff's remedies were available under its in-
fringement claims.
Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 670-71.
148 Id. at 671.
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 459 (7th Cir. 2000).Id.
151 Id. at 459.
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HERBROZAC"' Unlike PROZAC, no prescription is necessary to
purchase HERBROZAC online.
15
Before Natural Answers's launch of its herbal alternative to
PROZAC, Eli Lilly sued to enjoin the use of the HERBROZAC name,
claiming infringement under the Lanham Act, dilution under the
FTDA, and unfair competition under Indiana state law. 57 The district
court granted a preliminary injunction against Natural Answers, hold-
ing that Eli Lilly was likely to succeed in proving that the use of the
HERBROZAC name would likely confuse consumers. '5 The district
court also held that the plaintiff was not required to show actual dilu-
tion in order to obtain relief under the FTDA, and that there was a
likelihood of dilution of the PROZAC mark. 9 The district court re-
quired that Natural Answers discontinue the use of the HERBROZAC
name and remove all references to PROZAC from its website.1w
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision regard-
ing Eli Lilly's trademark dilution claim.' 6' Finding that the Fourth
Circuit's interpretation of the FTDA holds claimants to "an impossible
level of proof," the Court followed the Nabisco rule and held that a
mere likelihood of dilution was sufficient to satisfy the "causes dilu-
tion" element of the FTDA.1 2 After analyzing two of Mead Data's six
factors-the similarity of marks and the renown of the plaintiffs
mark-the Court found that Eli Lilly had shown a likelihood of suc-
cess in proving a likelihood of dilution and affirmed the district
court's grant of a preliminary injunction .1 6
155 Id.
156 Id. HERBROZAC tablets are "larger than average" and dark brown with black
specs, while PROZAC pills are green and off-white, and are "smaller than average." Id.
157 Id. at 460-61.
158 Id. at 461.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 469.
162 Id. at 468. The court, in choosing not to follow the evidentiary requirements of
Ringling Bros.. found it "hard to believe that Congress would create a right of action but
at the same time render proof of the plaintiff's case all but impossible." Id.
163 Id. at 469. In its decision to follow the Second Circuit's likelihood of dilution
standard, the court substantively overruled one of its earlier decisions, in which it had
adopted the actual harm test of Ringling Bros. See Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire
Paper Corp., 192 F.3d 633, 639 (7th Cir. 1999) (adopting the Ringling Bros. test in a
claim under the FDTA for dilution of plaintiff's trade dress in funeral floral bouquets).
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4. Victoria's Secret and the Sixth Circuit
Victoria's Secret sells a complete line of women's lingerie, as well
as other clothing and accessories, through its nationwide retail outlets,
mail-order catalogs, and Internet site. 114 According to a recent survey,
Victoria's Secret is rated as the ninth most famous brand in the ap-
parel industry. 1155
In 1998, defendants Victor and Cathy Moseley opened "Victor's
Secret," a strip-mall store that sold "a wide variety of items, "including
men's and women's lingerie, adult videos, sex toys and 'adult novel-
ties. ' 6 The defendants claimed that they were unaware of Victoria's
Secret's catalog or stores until they received a cease-and-desist letter
from Victoria's Secret soon after their store opened."" In response to
the letter, the defendants changed the name of their store to "Victor's
Little Secret."'"
Unsatisfied with the addition of "Little," Victoria's Secret brought
unfair competition, trademark infringement, and trademark dilution
claims against the Moseleys 69 The district court ruled in favor of Vic-
toria's Secret on its dilution claim, holding that the marks were suffi-
ciently similar to cause dilution-by-blurring and dilution-by-
tarnishment.'70
Finding it necessary to "resolve the apparent contradiction"7 ' of a
previous decision which cited both Nabisco and Ringling Bros. for its
determination on the elements of a dilution claim,' the Sixth Circuit
chose to apply the standards formulated in Nabisco to Victoria's Se-
cret's claim, thereby affirming the district court's ruling.'" The court
concluded that the Nabisco test-allowing an inference of likely harm
rather than requiring proof of actual injury-was consistent with the
164 V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 466 (6th Cir. 2001). The
"Victoria's Secret" mark has been federally registered since 1981. Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 466-67.
168 Id. at 467.
169 Id.
170 Id. The Moseleys changed the name of their store to "Cathy's Little Secret" af-
ter the district court's grant of summary judgment but nevertheless appealed the lower
court's order. Id. at 467-68.
7 ld. at 472 n.4.
72 Kellogg Co. v. Exxon Corp., 209 F.3d 562, 577 (6th Cir. 2000).
V73 Secret Catalogue, 259 F.3d at 476-77.
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language of the FTDA and hewn "more closely [to] Congress's intent
in enacting" that statute.174
IV. WHY FOLLOWING THE RINGLJNG BROS. TEST Is THE RIGHT PATH:
A RESPONSE TO THE ACTUAL DILUTION CRITICS
The Fifth Circuit appropriately chose to follow the Ringling Bros.
analysis of the FTDA's requirements, while the Third, Sixth, and Sev-
enth Circuits opted to follow the flawed standard set forth in Nabisco.
This is unfortunate, for it further widens a judicial split over an issue
that need not be so controversial. Although the FTDA provides no
specific guidance on how dilution should be measured or proven, the
FTDA does require a claimant to show actual dilution, not merely a
likelihood of dilution.7 A simple read of the FTDA's provisions says
as much.
By responding to the criticisms of the actual harm requirement
and analyzing the FTDA itself, this Part will discuss why the test prom-
ulgated by the Fourth Circuit in Ringling Bros., and later followed by
the Fifth Circuit in Westchester Media, is the correct standard of proof
and why the Second, Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits are on an ad-
judicatory path most susceptible to the uncertainty and inconsistency
that the FTDA intended to minimize.
A. Actual Dilution Can Be Proven
1. The Criticism
Critics of the actual dilution standard contend that actual dilution
cannot be proven.76 While some go so far as claiming that trademarks
are not even susceptible to dilution,'77 most critics agree that it is im-
[74 Id. at 474-76.
175 Cf Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, The New Wild West: Measuring and Proving Fame and
Dilution Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 63 ALB. L. REV. 201, 212 (1999)
(" [W] hile the Act requires a showing of actual dilution, it fails to provide any guidance
on how to determine the degree of dilution once a mark is found to be famous.").
176 See Port, supra note 30, at 447 ("No mark has ever actually, quantitatively been
established to have been diluted."); see also Reichman, supra note 12, at 134-35 (analyz-
ing problems of proof surrounding the concept of dilution).
7 See Port, supra note 30, at 447-49 (doubting the "existence of the idea of dilu-
tion" and asserting that legal protection from dilution thus creates "a remedy without a
wrong"); see also Gregg Duffey, Trademark Dilution Under the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act of 1995: You've Come a Long Way Baby-Too Far, Maybe?, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 133, 135
(1997) (noting that "[o]pponents of the dilution theory... view trademark dilution as
a remedy without a wrong").
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possible to show that a mark has been quantitatively harmed. 178 Even
if some sort of quantifiable loss could be shown, the claim is that it
would still be "extraordinarily speculative and difficult to prove that
the loss was due to the dilution of the mark." 179 Indeed, the oppo-
nents to the enactment of the FTDA complained that dilution, as de-




Actual dilution can be shown through reliable consumer survey
evidence depending on the dilution-by-tarnishment versus dilution-by-
blurring context. 8' Because actual blurring can be rationally inferred
based on the existence or nonexistence of mental associations be-
tween the senior and junior mark, surveys "may be a plaintiff's strong-
est and most persuasive evidence." 82 Therefore surveys that introduce
"the actual responses of a group of [relevant consumers] whose per-
ceptions are at issue in [the] case," provide a "more scientific means"
178 See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 223-24 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[T]he
senior user might never be able to show diminished revenues, no matter how obvious
it was that the junior use diluted the distinctiveness of the senior."); see also Nguyen,
supra note 175, at 235 (contending that "actual economic injury to a mark is extremely
difficult to demonstrate" and that while courts do grant monetary relief in cases where
the defendant's conduct is proven to be willful, "even then a defendant's willful con-
duct does not mean that actual economic harm to the famous mark has occurred or
can even be measured"). The assumption that proving actual dilution would be ex-
tremely difficult was central to the appellate decisions that followed Nabisco, for the
courts felt that it was "unlikely that Congress would have intended to create [the
FTDA] but then make its proof effectively unavailable." V Secret Catalogue, 259 F.3d at
476.
179 Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224.
180 Madrid Protocol, supra note 20, at 166 (statement of Jonathan E. Moskin, Part-
ner, Pennie & Edmonds).
181 In the tarnishment context, actual dilution can be demonstrated using a two-
cell product attribute survey where the control cell is used to measure the attributes
that consumers who are unfamiliar with the junior user's mark associate with the sen-
ior user's mark. Prager, supra note 14, at 132. The test cell is used to measure the at-
tributes that consumers who have been exposed to the defendant's mark associate with
the plaintiffs mark. Id. Tarnishment can also be shown by anecdotal evidence in the
form of testimony from the plaintiff's former customers claiming that they no longer
purchase products or services from the plaintiff because they mistakenly believe that
due to the tarnishing activities of the defendant that the quality of the plaintiffs prod-
ucts has declined. Id. at 131-32.
182 Patrick M. Bible, Defining and Quantifying Dilution Under the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act of 1995: Using Survey Evidence to Show Actual Dilution, 70 U. COLO. L. REv.
295, 314 (1999).
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of demonstrating trademark dilution. Actual dilution can be tested
by survey questions comparing the recognition and association of con-
sumers in the senior mark's channel of trade who have been exposed
to the junior mark to those consumers who have not been exposed to
it.18 4 In fact, well-crafted surveys could determine "whether a mark's
ability to convey quality and attribute associations has been damaged,"
regardless of consumer confusion, 1I'5 and show if there has been a de-
cline in the purchasing power of the plaintiffs mark before and after
the allegedly diluting use. Thus, it is not enough that the survey
show some mental association between the two marks in isolation, but
rather it must show "further consumer impressions from which actual
harm and cause might rationally be inferred.'
8 7
Though it may be difficult to show dilution through loss of reve-
nue, it is not implausible. In many cases it will be possible to look
back at revenues during the time period when the junior user first ap-
183 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 32:158, at 32-243; see also Bible, supra note 182, at
318-35 (detailing how a litigant should tailor a survey sample and questions in order to
prove actual dilution and prevent unreliable surveys from being subject to manipula-
tion).
184 SeeWaWa, Inc. v. Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1629, 1632-33 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 116
F.3d 471 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that plaintiff proved dilution of its "WaWa Food Mar-
kets" trademark by defendant's use of its convenience store name, "HaHa 24 Hour
Market," through survey evidence commissioned in the neighborhood surrounding
the HaHa market where twenty-nine percent of the respondents associated the HaHa
mark with WaWa); see also Nguyen, supra note 175, at 227-28 (arguing that the survey
evidence in Ringling Bros. was proof of a mental association between the two slogans
sufficient to show actual dilution-by-blurring); Reichman, supra note 12, at 135 (noting
that the problem with surveys is "that they are only useful to show actual dilution" and
arguing that the surveys in Ringling Bros., which showed that twenty-one percent of re-
spondents in Utah recalled both marks, were "extraordinarily persuasive evidence that
the ability of the senior mark to uniquely identify its goods has been weakened," where
"fewer people in Utah associated the mark with the circus alone").
185 Marroletti, supra note 38, at 690. Once such carefully tailored survey evidence
is presented, "a plaintiff could attempt to show that this loss resulted in decreased
sales. If shown, the decreased sales would be the result of a loss of the mark's selling
power regardless of consumer confusion. Such survey evidence ... would measure the
harm of trademark dilution, truly separate from consumer confusion." Id. at 690-91.
186 See Prager, supra note 14, at 133 (providing an example of how a survey could
show actual dilution by using likelihood of confusion readings as a surrogate for the
strength of a mark's purchasing power); see also Bible, supra note 182, at 327-28 ("An
effective survey.., must establish not only that consumers associate the mark with
both parties, but also that some quanta of the original mark's identifying ability or sell-
ing power has been diminished.").
87 Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 465.
88 The Ringling Bros. court did acknowledge that although a showing of actual di-
lution through loss of revenues would "rarely" be used by the plaintiff, this method
remained one of three "general means available" to prove actual dilution. Id.
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propriated the famous mark. "A gradual shift in revenue from the
senior user to the junior during the period in which the junior user
first implemented the mark would indicate that the senior user's mark
had been diluted."'89 Proof of the defendant's "replicating use" could
then be shown to have caused the loss of revenues by disproving other
possible causes.10
The problem is not that actual dilution cannot be shown, but that
an injunction based on the likelihood of trademark dilution will pro-
tect against an injury that is itself "speculative and therefore immeas-
urable."'"" In fact, it is the likelihood of dilution test, and not the ac-





Ironically, this makes the Second, Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits'
plaintiff-friendly standard more difficult to prove and thus more bur-
densome on plaintiffs, especially during a preliminary injunction pro-
ceeding "where plaintiffs may not have time to conduct a reliable con-
sumer survey to prove that the mark's ability to signify a particular
class or quality of goods has been or will be eroded."""
B. The Language and Legislative History of the F7DA
Supports the Actual Harm Requirement
1. The Criticism
Critics also contend that the actual harm requirement is at odds
with the language and legislative history of the FTDA.1 4 They argue
that it is inappropriate to equate and interpret "causes dilution" with
actual dilution given the acquired legal meaning of "dilution."" ' Dilu-
199 Brent G. Seitz, Case Note, The Actual Harm Requirement and the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act. Ringling Brothers-Barnum Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division
of Travel Development, 10J. ART & ENT. L. 113, 155-56 (1999).
190 Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 465.
91 Marroletti, supra note 38, at 688.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 See Matthew S. Voss, Berkeley Technology Law Journal Annual Review of Law and
Technology: Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of
Travel Development & Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 265,
277 (2000) (referring to the Ringling Bros. actual harm interpretation of the FTDA
based on the plain meaning rule as an "absurd result"). Most critics of the actual harm
requirement, however, concede that the plain language of the FTDA supports such a
requirement. See Klieger, supra note 25, at 840 (admitting that the plain language of
the FFDA creates an actual dilution requirement, but arguing that such an interpreta-
tion is not what Congress intended).
195 See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 224 (2d Cir. 1999) (conced-
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tion is by nature the "gradual whittling away" of the advertising and
marketing value of a trademark, which the critics contend "represents
a slow, gradual type of harm that is simply not amenable to proof
through a showing of actual economic harm."" ' This is why Nabisco
(and its progeny) determined that the actual harm requirement read
too much into the meaning of the FTDA, substituting "excessive liter-
alism to defeat the intent of the statute.' 97
In addition, critics rely on the "overwhelming history" of state an-
tidilution statutes, which permit injunctions to prevent likely future
injuries, to show that the interpretation of the FTDA should incorpo-
rate a likelihood of dilution standard.'9" Further, it is posited that the
FTDA does not require proof of an actual lessening of the market
power of the plaintiff's mark, ' but only proof of a "lessening of the
capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or serv-
ices." 20 0 This argument assumes that because dilution is defined in
this manner by the FTDA, the FTDA implicitly adopts the likelihood
of dilution standard because "capacity" refers to future capacity and ac-
tual dilution is not necessary to adversely affect this type of capacityY'
Moreover, critics of the actual harm requirement point out that
no legislative history exists suggesting that the claimant must demon-
ing that "causes dilution" is used in the present tense but stating that "it seems plausi-
bly within Congress's meaning to understand the statute as intending to provide for an
injunction to prevent the harm before it occurs" (emphasis added)).
1% Voss, supra note 194, at 277; see also McCabe, supra note 38, at 1861-62 (noting
that by imposing an actual harm requirement, courts wrongly assume that dilution re-
suilts in "immediate injury"); Nguyen, supra note 175, at 235 ("[T]he [Ringling Bros.]
court failed to recognize that dilution of a mark does not occur overnight.").
191 F.3d at 224.
198 Voss, supra note 194, at 277.
'in See Nguyen, supra note 175, at 235 n.250 (citing 4 MCCARTI-iY, supra note 11, §
24:94, at 24-160 to -161, as authority that actual loss is not required under the Act as
long as there is some proof of loss of the mark's strength as a commercial symbol and
identifier).
2W 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. V 1999) (emphasis added).
201 See Reichman, supra note 12, at 132 (supporting the view that claimant need
only show a likelihood of dilution tinder the FTDA since the dilution definition's use
of the word "capacity" indicates that it is "the junior user's ability to dilute that is ac-
tionable, not actual dilution in the marketplace" (emphasis added)); Voss, supra note
194, at 278 (suggesting that the definition of dilution under the FTDA "imports an
element of futurity" since a "better interpretation" of the word "capacity" bears the
meaning of "future capacity"); see also 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 24:95, at 24-193 to
-194 ("In the author's opinion, 'dilution' as defined in Lanham Act § 43(c) can and
should be read to include tarnishment .... [T]arnishment necessarily involves some
degree of probable loss of the capability of the mark to serve as a distinctive identifier."
(emphasis added)).
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strate actual, consummated harm to establish dilution.2 °2 They argue
further that if Congress intended such a strict requirement, it is
"strange" that they would not specifically mention it in the FTDA .
Conversely, despite admitting that the legislative history of the FTDA
is scant, some critics opine that the statute may be read to suggest a
likelihood of dilution standard because it states that "federal trade-
mark law presently coexists with state trademark law, and it is to be




The actual dilution requirement is supported by the plain mean-
ing and legislative history of the FTDA. It is clear that the FTDA does
not incorporate the "likelihood of dilution" language that most state
antidilution statutes used.2 5 When Congress passed the FTDA it was
well aware that twenty-five states had dilution laws of their own (some
of which had been in existence for almost fifty years) and certainly
knew of the fact that those states had dilution laws that provided relief
if the defendant's mark would likely dilute the plaintiffs mark.2 0 6
Congress, with its knowledge of dilution theory in general and state
remedies in particular, abandoned the words "likelihood" or "likely"
202 See Voss, supra note 194, at 278 (referring to the legislative history of the 1988
dilution bill, the FTDA, and the Report of the Trade Mark Commission); see also
Klieger, supra note 25, at 839 (noting that the Senate did not hold any hearings or en-
gage in any floor debate when it passed the FTDA by voice vote).
203 Voss, supra note 194, at 279. Critics also point to the House Report statement
that "the use of DUPONT shoes, BUICK aspirin, and KODAK pianos would be action-
able under this legislation," H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, to show that actual economic harm is not required.
204 H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031.
205 See supra text accompanying note 47 (noting a key difference between the
FTDA and many of its state counterparts); see also Bible, supra note 182, at 307-08
(highlighting the explicit references to "causes dilution" and the evidence against us-
ing a "likelihood of dilution" standard); Prager, supra note 14, at 130-36 (arguing that
the FTDA language of "causes dilution" is a higher standard than the previous "likeli-
hood of dilution" language); Krafte-Jacobs, supra note 80, at 667-68 ("[T]he FTDA
does not-at least facially-provide for a 'likelihood of dilution.' Rather, [a] court is
empowered to grant an injunction only where the subsequent user 'causes dilution."').
Arkansas is the only state whose antidilution statute follows the FTDA's language ver-
batim. Facer, supra note 35, at 885 n.92.
206 H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 2-3, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030. It
would be wrong to assume otherwise since one of the purposes of the FTDA was to
provide uniform, nationwide relief to trademark dilution due to inconsistencies among
state antidilution statutes. See supra text accompanying notes 37-42 (describing the
conditions that led to the passage of the FTDA).
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in its drafting of the FTDA. In fact, one observer states that
"[r] eading the FTDA as it was drafted by Congress, no conclusion is
possible other than that a showing of actual dilution is required for
relief under the FTDA."20 8 Indeed, it is even more "strange" to inter-
pret the FTDA as requiring only a likelihood of dilution when Con-
gress deliberately refused to use such language, despite the fact that it
had the state dilution statutes before it as a model.""-
Further, the use of the word "capacity" in the FTDA has a neutral,S 210
temporal meaning. Critics read too much into the statute by equat-
ing the term with "future capacity." Adding new meaning to a word
that Congress did not intend is judicial irresponsibility and statutory
bastardization.'" If Congress intended to provide protection of a fa-
mous mark's future capacity to identify and distinguish its goods and
services, it would have included language as such.
2 By not prefacing
the word "capacity" with any temporal modifiers, Congress ensured
20 The fact that the FTDA's language almost identically tracks the Model State
Trademark Bill, the language of which was imported into many state dilution statutes,
evidences Congress's use of state dilution legislation as a model for the FTDA. Mer-
min, supra note 30, at 230; see also supra text accompanying notes 35-36 (observing that,
at the time the FTDA was signed into law, a majority of the states already had adopted
antidilution statutes). Unlike the FTDA, however, the Model Bill used the phrase
"likelihood of" to modify the word "dilution." Mermin, supra note 30, at 230. "Unless
courts are to assume that Congress made an error in drafting, the natural inference is
that it intended not to create a vague, open-ended 'likelihood of dilution' cause of ac-
tion and omitted the phrase 'likelihood of' for that reason." Id.; see also supra text ac-
companying note 82 (noting that, unlike most state statutes, the FTDA requires a
plaintiff to prove actual dilution).
208 Seitz, supra note 189, at 153-54. Proponents of the likelihood of dilution stan-
dard come to the same conclusion as well. See Klieger, supra note 25, at 840 (asserting
that Congress did not intend to require a showing of actual dilution, but admitting
that the FI)A's language "creates an actual dilution requirement-junior use of a
mark must actually dilute the senior mark before it can be enjoined").
209 See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of
Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 461 (4th Cir. 1999) ("[T]here is a fact that in the face of the
obvious centrality of 'likelihood of dilution' provisions in the interpretation and appli-
cation of state antidilution statutes for the fifty years of their existence, the federal Act
does not so provide."); see also supra text accompanying note 207 (suggesting that Con-
gress deliberately omitted the phrase "likelihood of dilution" from the language of the
FrDA).
210 See Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 460 ("One can surely speak expressly of 'present
capacity,' or... 'future capacity,' or. . . 'former capacity,' but unless it is so temporally
modified or otherwise given its intended temporal meaning, the word is neutral in that
respect. In context here, it is plain that the 'capacity' spoken of is 'former capacity.'").
211 SeeSeitz, supra note 189, at 154 ("Not only does this interpretation [of the word
'capacity'] give a new and unintended meaning to the language of the statute as a
whole, it also gives a new meaning to the word 'capacity' as used in the statute.").
212 Id.
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consistency in maintaining "present tense" protection of famous
marks in its drafting of the FTDA/: This is further evidenced by the
FTDA's use of the present tense phrase "causes dilution," which even
the Nabisco court correctly observed
1 4
The FTDA does not include phrases such as "future capacity,"
"will lessen," "may lessen," "could cause dilution," "may cause dilu-
tion," "will cause dilution," or "likely to cause dilution." Such tempo-
ral modifiers and conditional language are notably absent."5 This ab-
sence should take prominence in statutory interpretation when all
that can be relied on is the statute's language and sparse legislative
• 2116
history. Reading and interpreting a statute as it is plainly written by
our federal lawmakers in this context is not the least bit "excessive,"
but is in fact the "literalism" required of thejudiciary. 7 Ignoring the
language of a statute, however, especially when the legislative history is
arguably nonexistent, is "excessive liberalism" and subjective judicial
intuition that defeats the statute's intent.
2 11
213 Seitz, supra note 189, at 155.
214 Supra note 195.
21 5 The definition of dilution in the FTDA does include the phrase "likelihood of
confusion, mistake, or deception" to reinforce the notion that consumer confusion is
unnecessary for federal dilution relief. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. V 1999). "The ap-
pearance of a 'likelihood of' formulation in the text of the FTDA itself further under-
mines the argument that Congress intended to establish a 'likelihood of dilution'
standard by implication. In drafting the FIDA, when Congress intended to say 'likelihood of
X,'it said just that; 'causes dilution' should therefore not be read to mean 'likelihood of
dilution."' Mermin, supra note 30, at 231 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
216 According to the Supreme Court, the plain meaning rule instructs the judiciary
that "[i]f the words convey a definite meaning which involves no absurdity, nor any
contradiction of other parts of the instrument, then that meaning, apparent on the
face of the instrtment, must be accepted." Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670
(1889); see aLso Seitz, supra note 189, at 155 (noting that the RinglingBros. court "relied
on the only information that it had, the language and history of the FTDA"). Indeed,
commentators who advocate the Nabisco standard are trying to garner support to acid
the modifying "likelihood of" to the "causes dilution" phrase in the FTDA, revealing
their own qualms about advocating a standard that the statutory language does not so
provide. See, e.g., Ahearn, supra note 32, at 913-18 (supporting the Nabisco standard as
appropriate and recommending a statutory amendment to ensure that the ingling
Bros. standard is not followed); Slonaker, supra note 54, at 153-54 (recommending that
Congress amend the FTDA and adopt the "likelihood" standard, and thus restore reli-
abilitr to the Act).
Even the critics of the Fourth Circuit's use of the plain meaning rule to inter-
pret the FTDA concede this notion. See Voss, supra note 194, at 278 (acknowledging
the usefilness of legislative history, but noting that "purely textual arguments un-
doubtedly carry the greatest interpretative weight").
218 See Seitz, supra note 189, at 155 (arguing that by ignoring the language of the
FTDA, the Nabisco court did not follow the intent of the Act, but "read its own meaning
into the statute so as to produce the outcome it desired").
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The FTDA's intended coexistence with the states and the long his-
tory of state relief for trademark dilution do not necessarily imply that
claims under the FTDA are to follow the requirements of state laws or
the analysis of state courts. Nor should it. The FTDA was in no way
meant to usurp state dilution statutes or merge into them, but critics'
insertion of a likelihood of dilution test effectively does this to the
state dilution laws currently in force.1 1  Coexistence means working
together, not replacing one another. A federal remedy is a federal
remedy, not a state one. To propose that satisfaction of a state remedy
by fulfilling the criteria of a state law automatically confers federal re-
lief to the claimant is absurd.2 ° The absurdity does not go away simply
because such a proposition is applied to the trademark dilution con-
text.2
1
C. The Intent and Purpose of the FTDA Supports
the Actual Harm Requirement
1. The Criticism
Critics consider the actual harm test to be at odds not only with
the F-FDA's language and legislative history, but also with the statute's
intent and purpose. They claim that the loss Congress sought to rem-
edy was a loss in the distinctiveness of a mark, not solely its economic
222valuer. Indeed, they note that a loss in a mark's distinctiveness can
219 See supra text accompanying note 35 (listing all thirty-four existing state antidi-
lution statutes).
220 Most courts that employ likelihood of dilution analysis, unlike the actual harm
test, base their decisions not on the FrDA, but cite state antidilution laws for support.
This is unfortunate and improper simply because of the striking differences in word
choice between the FTDA and state statutes. See Seitz, supra note 189, at 157 ("Courts
which engage in this practice are deceiving themselves and the parties involved into
thinking that their decision is based on the FTDA, when it is in fact based on the state
dilution statute used in the case they chose to cite."); see also Times Mirror Magazines,
Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157, 168-69 (3d Cir. 2000) (relying on a
state antidilution case in its analysis of the plaintiff's dilution claim); Elvis Presley En-
ters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 193 (5th Cir. 1998) (supporting the proposition that
only a likelihood of dilution is required under the FTDA by citing a case which specifi-
cally dealt with a state dilution statute); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d
1316, 1326 n.7 (9th Cir. 1998) (defining dilution based on a state case decided before
the FTDA's enactment).
221 In addition, unlike state dilution laws, which only provide injunctive relief, the
FTDA provides compensatory and restitutionary damages for necessarily consummated
economic harm where willful conduct is shown. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c)(2), 1117(a),
1118 (Supp. V 1999).
222 Many point to the Senate Judiciary Report from the failed 1988 dilution bill to
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even occur when there is no economic harm2 Thus, the critics ar-
gue that requiring a showing of actual economic harm makes federal
dilution relief superfluous by erecting an insurmountable barrier to
224any federal dilution action.
Under the actual harm standard, the FTDA provides no effective
remedy for famous and distinctive marks. Instead, it forces a senior
user to wait until its mark has actually suffered a material loss before
an injunction can be issued. This contradicts the very nature of di-
lution and thus the federal statute designed to provide for its relief,
since dilution is assumed to be synonymous with a gradual loss of
226uniqueness, whether or not there is actual economic harm. There-
fore, by not compensating the injury Congress sought to be remedied
(loss of distinctiveness) until a claimant can show actual harm (which
227they believe cannot be shown), the test followed by the Fourth and
Fifth Circuits is no test at all, but a barrier irreconcilable with the in-
tent and purpose of the FTDA.
Further, the critics contend that the actual loss requirement is in-
consistent with the FTDA because it injures the junior user. The jun-
ior user would be disadvantaged because such a requirement prevents
the junior user from knowing whether it will be prohibited from using
its new mark until after it actually implements the mark in the mar-
228ketplace. Unable to seek declaratory relief before the mark is in the
market, junior users will be "obligated to spend the huge sums in-
amend the Lanham Act which stated that the bill would apply "when the unauthorized
use of a famous mark reduces the public's perception that the mark signifies some-
thing unique, singular, or particular." S. REP. No. 100-515, at 19 (1988).
23 See Klieger, supra note 25, at 841 ("Anyjunior use of a mark, whether or not it
undermines the senior user's selling power, necessarily renders the mark less unique,
such that any junior use is tantamount to a showing of actual dilution under the Act.");
see also S. REP. NO. 100-515, at 45 ("The distinctive quality of a mark could be mater-
ally reduced during a period of rising sales for the product bearing the mark.").
224 See, e.g., Voss, supra note 194, at 277 ("[The Ringling Bros.] court's plain mean-
ing interpretation requiring actual harm may have resulted in a statute that effectively
provides no remedy at all .... ).
225 See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 224 (2d Cir. 1999) ("To read
the statute as suggested by the Ringling Bros. opinion would subject the senior user to
uncompensable injury. The statute could not be invoked until injury had occurred.").
226 This is the critics' assumption of the definition of dilution, discussed in this sec-
tion.
227 The Nabisco court referred to actual dilution as an "arbitrary and unwarranted
limitation on the methods of proof." 191 F.3d at 223; see also supra Part IV.A.1 (high-
lighting the arguments claiming that actual dilution cannot be shown).
228 See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224 (stating that the Ringling Bros. reading of the FTDA
is "disastrously disadvantageous for the junior user" because a junior user would want
to know whether its mark will be permitted before, rather than after, it is launched).
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volved in a product launch without the ability to seek prior judicial as-
surance that their mark will not be enjoined."2 2  Therefore, critics
claim, by offering no federal relief to senior users and unnecessarily
burdening possibly legitimate junior users, the Ringling Bros. reading
of the FTDA contradicts the statute's intent and purpose.
2. The Response
The FTDA's aim is to protect a mark's selling power rather than
its distinctiveness. 230 To say otherwise, that the interest sought to be
protected by the FIDA is the senior mark's distinctiveness as such, is
the "radical property right-in-gross model of dilution" as originally
proposed by Professor Schechter.23' If Congress had intended to cre-
ate such property rights "unlimited in time, '32 it would not have de-
fined dilution in the manner it chose. Rather, Congress simply would
have prohibited the use of anyjunior mark that substantially replicates
the senior mark, whether or not the senior mark suffered any harm.
3
However, by proscribing injury to the senior mark's economic value in
the form of a "lessening of the capacity [of that mark] to identify and
distinguish goods and services,"25 ' and by limiting its scope to injuries
causally connected with the "commercial use" of the replicating juniorS235
mark, the FTDA pursues a purpose that is wholly consistent with the
actual harm standard as that requirement prevents the creation of un-
intended property rights in gross for trademark holders.
Because of dilution protection's alleged monopolistic tenden-
cies, 36 whether generally real or only stemming from the "in-gross"
229 Id.
230 Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 458. Even some critics admit that dilution is meant
to protect not just a mark's distinctiveness, but its selling power as well. See Klieger,
supra note 25, at 840 ("[T]he very premise of dilution is that no single junior use suffi-
ciently undermines the distinctiveness and selling power of a mark to be objectively
identified or measured." (emphasis added)).
231 Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 459; see also Klieger, supra note 25, at 851 (discussing
the undesirability of trademark rights in gross that bestow "upon the senior user of a
mark a property right no less than that in patents, copyrights, or physical assets").
232 170 F.3d at 459.
233 Id.; see also Klieger, supra note 25, at 813 n.134 ("[T]o say that the senior mark
will inevitably lose its 'commercial magnetism' or 'selling power' [from any replicating
junior use] is far from intuitive."); Mermin, supra note 30, at 232 (arguing that if Con-
gress wanted to create "a trademark regime without a consumer confusion standard"
one would expect it to have been clear about what it was doing).
234 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. V 1999).
235 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1) (Supp. V 1999) (emphasis added).
236 See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing how antidilution theory
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fear brought by broad applicability, inserting a nationwide likelihood
of dilution standard into the FTDA undermines the statute's aim be-
cause it exacerbates (or itself creates) the supposed anticompetitive
effects of unrestrained dilution. Requiring proof of causation and in-
jury encourages healthy competition in the marketplace. Providing
relief when no injury is present or proven unduly hinders competition
and conflicts with the design of the law employed to provide such re-
lief.
While it may benefit junior users to know whether their marks are
legitimate before their market introduction, the costs of the likeli-
hood of dilution standard far outweigh this alleged benefit. The like-
lihood of dilution standard "effectively stifles competition at the pre-
liminary injunction stage.2 3 8 By not requiring the plaintiff to show
that its mark has been actually harmed in order to satisfy its burden,239
this standard will delay the release of products or services that may not
even cause any dilution. Larger companies with sufficient resources
will then be able to "squash" the competition by bringing an action for
a preliminary injunction in a court that follows the Nabisco test-a
standard that is effectively no standard at all. 4' In this scenario, pre-
ventive medicine is not a remedy, but rather a recipe for senior en-
trenchment.
The actual dilution test, on the other hand, allows the junior user
to place its mark into the stream of commerce so that a determination
can be made as to "whether it actually dilutes a famous mark. The
creates an in-gross right in trademarks).
237 For an overview of this argument, see supra Part 1V.C. 1.
28 Marroletti, supra note 38, at 689.
239 See also supra Part IV.A.2 (discussing the near impossibility of showing likeli-
hood of dilution at the preliminary injunction stage).
See Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 460 (discussing causation and noting that "'marks
can lose their distinctiveness or power to identify goods and services for various rea-
sons other than the use of ajunior mark"' (citation omitted) (quoting Ringling Bros.-
Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 955 F. Supp. 605,
615 (E.D. Va. 1997)); see also Marroletti, supra note 38, at 688-89 (noting that products
have specific release dates determined by marketing research and contending that
granting preliminary injunctions on the basis of a likelihood of dilution standard
would force companies to "settle, change their product or packaging, or wait to release
theirproduct or advertising at a time when it is no longer viable").
24 See Marroletti, supra note 38, at 689 (arguing that the injury against which a
likelihood of dilution standard protects is "speculative and therefore immeasurable,"
and that the test therefore gives senior users the power to block competition by forcing
junior users to settle); see also Mermin, supra note 30, at 232 (referring to the ten-factor
Nabisco test as a "convoluted" and "unwieldy" test that could be "used in practice to jus-
tify whatever outcome the court prefers").
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likelihood standard would deprive the junior user of such an oppor-
tunity.' '242  Denying emerging companies any chance to compete is
neither the aim of trademark dilution protection nor the purpose of
the FTDA. It is also not the statute's intent to provide senior mark us-
ers with unbridled and unlimited protection at all costs. However, a
likelihood of dilution standard does just that by extending protection
to senior trademark owners confronted with any sort of competition.
Thus courts, to be faithful to the language and the intent of the
FTDA, must ensure that dilution claims are not employed by famous
mark owners to inhibit competition without proving quantifiable
harm. 43 If not, courts will be in the business of encouraging monopo-
listic practices by protecting famous marks even when there is "no
damage to [their] function,"244 thereby undermining the purpose of
trademark protection.2 4' This is the "remedy without a wrong" fear
coming home to roost.
CONCLUSION
The likelihood-of-dilution standard, employed by the Second Cir-
cuit and later followed by the Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, is
purely a creation of state law and judicial fiat, and has no connection
to the FTDA. 46 In arriving at its decision to require merely an infer-
ence of likely dilution, the Nabisco court completely ignored the sig-
nificant differences between state antidilution statutes and the
FTDA.247  Despite the obvious difference in language, the court as-
242 Seitz, supra note 189, at 156.
243 Marroletti, supra note 38, at 687.
244 Id. at 689; see also Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 460 (claiming that it is probable
that some junior uses will have no effect at all on a senior mark's economic value,
"whether for lack of exposure, general consumer disinterest in both marks' products,
or other reasons"). In fact, junior uses may help senior mark holders. See id. (suggest-
ing that replicating uses could enhance a senior mark's attraction amongst buyers by
drawing attention to the renown of the senior mark); Seitz, supra note 189, at 156 ("If
the likelihood of dilution standard is adopted many marks may be enjoined which, if
allowed to be used in the marketplace, may not actually dilute the senior's mark.").
245 See Lerner, supra note 30, at 455 (arguing that the Nabisco court's insertion of a
likelihood of dilution standard in the FTDA "substantially furthered the transforma-
tion of dilution law into a right in gross.... allowing trademark owners the unprece-
dented possibility of perpetual and exclusive rights over the shape of certain marks").
246 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 220 (highlighting flawed federal deci-
sions that relied on state dilution decisions rather than the FITDA and noting that the
Third Circuit, in Times Mirror, inappropriately relied on a case that only involved a state
dilution statute in holding that the FTDA merely mandates a likelihood of dilution
showing).
247 Voss, supra note 194, at 280.
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sumed, without any analysis, that New York's antidilution law and the
FFDA require the same standard of proof.2 4  Moreover, the Second
Circuit confused dilution with infringement in that it emphasized the
likelihood of consumers confusing the two marks at issue in reaching
its result, when, by definition, consumer confusion is not evidence of
• • 249
dilution. The Third Circuit furthered the problem not only by fol-
lowing the Second Circuit's improper jurisprudential standard, but
also by affirming the lower court's use of a state dilution case, decided
before the FTDA was even enacted, to find for the senior user.250
The actual harm requirement, while placing a higher burden of
proof on the claimant, is not an impenetrable barrier. Rather than
erecting an insurmountable obstacle to relief, the actual harm stan-
dard prevents the "causing dilution" requirement in the FTDA from
becoming a malleable standard that can be loosely applied at the will
of thejudiciary.5  The language and intent of the FTDA as well as the
doctrine of dilution necessitates a clear and difficult test, not a stan-
dard that is speculative, ambiguous, and open to abuse. The latter
would lead to disastrous monopolistic results and further compound
adjudicatory inconsistencies. The actual dilution standard, at the
least, protects against trademark overprotection, thereby preventing
dilution theory from swallowing up not only its federal statutory off-
spring, but also trademark law in general.
24H For example, in holding that the FTDA applies to both competing and non-
competing marks, the Nabisco court stated, "[w]e have already held that New York's
antidilution statute applies to 'competitors as well as noncompetitors,' and we now so
hold under the FTDA." Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 223 (2d Cir.
1999) (citation omitted). Indeed, the court seemed to suggest that since Nabisco
would be found in violation of New York's dilution statute anyway, an actual dilution
test would not "help" Nabisco. Thus, reading into the F1'DA a likelihood of dilution
standard would be the more appropriate route. See id. at 225 n.7 ("We note further
that [an actual dilution test] cannot help Nabisco because the district court found vio-
lation of both the federal and the New York State antidilution statutes, and the latter
expressly applies to 'likelihood of injury... or of dilution."' (citation omitted)).
249 See supra note 117 and accompanying text ("The likelihood of consumer confu-
sion is evidence of infringement, not of dilution.").
250 See Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d
157, 168-69 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding no error in the district court's use of the six-factor
test in Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, Inc., 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989), a
New York state antidilution case that predated the FrDA by six years, to hold that the
plaintiff was likely to prevail on its dilution claim).
251 See Marroletti, supra note 38, at 688 ("[The Ringling Bros. court] created aworkable standard for the practical application of a notoriously elusive concept. By
requiring proof of injury and causation, the court's interpretation limited the applica-
tion of a confusing legal standard that is easily abused.").
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